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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The town of Niobrara grew up on the riverbank where the Niobrara River flows into the Missouri
River, at the border between northern Nebraska and southern South Dakota. The site was chosen
to make the town easily accessible by steamboat and the rivers allowed for the creation of a
lumber mill. By 1880, Niobrara’s 24th year of existence, the population had swelled to nearly
850, signifying the economic growth afforded by the river. But for all its economic potential, the
river proved to be an enemy of residents of Niobrara. In the early spring of 1881 an ice gorge
broke, releasing a rush of water and ice that submerged the town in six feet of water for two full
days. By the end of the spring, the river had flooded twice more, washing out bridges, mill dams,
and railroad lines. Within weeks, Niobrara residents had lifted their houses onto wheeled frames
hitched to oxen and horses. House by house, the town began to migrate westward to a new site
on higher ground just a mile and a half away.1 The move became the earliest well-documented
relocation of an entire town in modern U.S. history.2
It was not the last time Niobrara moved. The flooding problem reemerged in the
mid-twentieth century, this time resulting from the construction of two dams on the Missouri
River, which created build up of sediment at the mouth of the Niobrara River. The sediment
pushed groundwater into Niobrara basements, sometimes up to three feet deep. Again, the
residents of Niobrara organized to pull off a feat of urban teleportation. Between 1973 and 1977
the town disappeared and reappeared on what was once pastureland, just south of the old site.
2 John Carey, “Managed retreat increasingly seen as necessary in response to climate change’s fury,” PNAS, vol. 117,
no. 3 (2020): 13182.
1 John E. Carter, “Niobrara, Nebraska: the Town Too Tough to Stay Put!” Nebraska History, vol. 72 (1991): 145.
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The federally-funded relocation cost an estimated $14.5 million.3 The former site, which held the
transient town from 1881 to 1973, became open, undeveloped land, tolerant of floods.
Niobrara’s second relocation is one of the earliest examples of a modern flood buyout.4 In
a flood buyout, a local government will buy properties that have been affected by flooding,
demolish any structures, and return the land to an undeveloped state. In some cases the open land
becomes part of a park, and in other cases it is simply left alone. The original property owner
typically receives a payment of the pre-flood value of the home and must find a new home. The
outcome of a buyout is an individual move out of harm’s way for the former property owner, and
the collective benefit for the surrounding community of additional natural space which can better
absorb and filter flood water.
Buyouts demonstrate a strategy of “managed retreat” from environmental hazards, a
strategy which relies on land-use regulation rather than infrastructure to protect communities.5
Retreat from natural hazards has been happening across the United States for a long time,
whether as part of a formal government program or simply through the cumulative effect of
individual choices.6 The strategy of managed retreat has become increasingly important as
planners and members of the public reckon with predictions of intensified natural disasters due to
climate change. In June of 2019, 400 academics, city leaders, industry representatives, and others
gathered in New York City for what was considered the first major academic conference on
managed retreat.7 Public support for strategic managed retreat is growing as well. A 2020 survey
of American public opinion on climate change and the environment found that 59% of
7 Carey, “Managed retreat increasingly seen as necessary,” 13183.
6 A. R. Siders, Miyuki Hino, and Katharine J. Mach, “The case for strategic and managed climate retreat.” Science,
vol. 365, no. 6455 (2019): 761.
5 Some researchers reject the defeatist connotations of the term “managed retreat” and prefer terms such as “strategic
location,” “planned relocation,” and “strategic advance.”
4 In flood buyout literature, Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin’s relocation in 1978 is commonly referred to as the first
buyout in the U.S., but Niobrara’s 1973 move predates Soldiers Grove.
3 Carter, “Niobrara, Nebraska,” 149.
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respondents supported paying those facing flood risk to move to safer places. Among those who
believed that climate change is causing more severe floods, nearly three quarters supported
adaptation policy action.8 In the nearly five decades since the Niobrara buyout, floodplain buyout
programs have proliferated across the country, with buyouts occurring in every state except
Hawaii.9 All FEMA-funded buyouts are voluntary, though programs with other sources of
funding can use eminent domain.10 While not rare, most of these buyout programs have been
modest in scale and the true harm reduction potential of large-scale buyout programs remains
unknown. Though floodplain buyout programs have a long legacy, they are an underused tool
now reaching its moment.
DEVELOPMENT AND ITS UNDOING
A discussion of buyouts requires a definition of the problem of urban flooding. There are many
categories of floods. They can occur within a matter of hours, called flash floods, or unfold
incrementally over weeks or months. Some are caused by precipitation, while others may be
triggered by a collapsed dam, and others may originate from sea level rise or storm surge. In the
U.S., riverine flooding is the number one cause of flood-related damage.11 Flooding is not purely
detrimental. Outside of the context of human harm and destruction, flooding offers
environmental benefits, bringing improved soil fertility through deposits and replenishing
groundwater supplies.12 Floods are defined not only through their ecological properties, but also
12 Roy Ward, Floods: A Geographical Perspective (John Wiley & Sons, 1978), 114.
11 Freudenberg et al., Buy-In for Buyouts: The Case for Managed Retreat from Flood Zones (Cambridge, MA:
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2016), 10.
10 D. H. de Vries and J. C. Fraser, “Citizenship rights and voluntary decision making in post-disaster U.S. floodplain
buyout mitigation programs.,” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, vol. 30, no. 1 (2012): 2.
9 Kevin Loughran and James R. Elliott, “Residential buyouts as environmental mobility: Examining where
homeowners move to illuminate social inequities in climate adaptation.” Population and Environment, vol. 41, no. 1
(2019): 55.
8 Bo MacInnis and Jon A. Krosnick, Climate Insights 2020: Natural Disasters, Washington, DC: Resources for the
Future (2020): 8 &14.
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through their relationship to human activity. The flow of water through an urban or developed
area may be considered a “natural disaster,” a consequence of environmental conditions, but in
fact, it is as much constructed by humans, a product of social processes. Geographer Roy Ward
writes, “floods only become a hazard when they impinge unfavorably upon human activity.”13
Afterall, left on its own, a waterlogged marsh is not considered flooded. Compared to other
natural disasters, Ward comments, “flooding is the most obviously self-inflicted.”14
Deforestation, land change related to agriculture, and urban development all affect the drainage
capacity of land and worsen flooding.15 Increases in the surface area of asphalt and concrete
correspond to increased runoff for a given amount of rainfall.16 Furthermore, the death and
destruction attributed to flooding often arises from governmental failure to plan for the disaster
and enact recovery efforts for vulnerable populations.17 An examination of the problem of
flooding implicates governmental and human intervention in water systems.
In the early days of U.S. cities, floodplains and coasts were desirable places for
settlements; in hilly regions, they were flat, and in dry regions, they were wet. Proximity to water
allowed for transport, trade, and industry, as is evident in Niobrara’s history as a lumber mill
town. Though these advantages have lost some of their importance, the precedent set by early
settlement produced a momentum that has allowed large cities to develop, precariously situated
on floodplains. Because floods can be sporadic, a city can grow rapidly before the magnitude of
a flood hazard is fully recognized.18 Despite a modern understanding of the risks, floodplain
development has continued at an alarming rate across the U.S. Since 2010, flood-prone areas
18 Ward, Floods, 113 & 125.
17 Robert D. Bullard, “Differential Vulnerabilities: Environmental and Economic Inequality and Government
Response to Unnatural Disasters,” Social Research, vol. 75, no. 3 (2008): 757.
16 Wei Zhang et al. “Urbanization exacerbated the rainfall and flooding caused by hurricane Harvey in Houston.”
Nature 563, no. 7731 (2018): 384
15 Ibid., 134.
14 Ibid., 128.
13 Ward, Floods, 114.
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have seen higher rates of new construction than safer areas in many coastal states, a trend driven
by factors such as the desirability of waterfront property, a governmental reluctance to regulate
and lose out on property tax revenue, and urban sprawl.19 Climate change will compound the
nation’s flooding problem, causing sea level rise, more frequent and intense storms, and
unpredictable rainfall. Land subsidence, which results from overdrawing groundwater, is yet
another factor magnifying the flooding problem. The U.S. has more subsidence-driven flood risk
than any other country, and the problem is particularly severe on the West Coast. By 2030, the
U.S. is projected to experience an additional $16 billion in annual flood damage to urban
property. Globally, the number of people affected by coastal floods is projected to reach 15
million by 2030, while those affected by riverine floods is projected to reach 132 million.20 The
importance of addressing this looming threat cannot be overstated.
If flooding is a problem of development, buyouts present a natural solution; they reverse
development, creating open land where a building once stood. Unlike other approaches to
environmental risk, such as building infrastructure, a buyout requires a one-time investment with
no further action, with the result of completely eliminating the risk for residents of a particular
area or property.21 In comparison, flood infrastructure requires regular maintenance and is more
fallible. In some cases, infrastructure like shoreline armoring can encourage development of an
unsafe area, resulting in a greater number of people facing risk.22 Though buyouts more
effectively eliminate risk on an individual level, they are “the most socially dramatic and
permanent solution” to flooding.23 Buyouts displace vulnerable people and must be carefully
23 de Vries and Fraser, “Citizenship rights and voluntary decision making,” 2.
22 Siders et al., “The case for retreat,” 762.
21 Freudenberg et al., Buy-In for Buyouts, 8.
20 Kuzma, Samantha and Tianyi Luo. “The Number of People Affected by Floods Will Double Between 2010 and
2030.” World Resources Institute, April 23, 2020. https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/04/aqueduct-floods-investment-
green-gray-infrastructure.
19 Christopher Flavelle, “Homes Are Being Built the Fastest in Many Flood-Prone Areas, Study Finds.” The New
York Times, July 31, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/31/climate/climate-change-new-homes-flooding.html.
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implemented for this reason. Consideration should be given to the theory behind buyout
programs and the power dynamics that shape them.
POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
The straight lines of the city, its concrete and metal, its smooth glass surfaces, its harsh sounds
and perpetual bright lights suggest something entirely unnatural. Yet cities exist as part of a
natural environment, not separate from nature. Just as natural processes are touched by human
hands, social and urban processes are guided by natural processes. Eric Swyngedouw describes
this dynamic with the term “socionature,” which captures how “nature and society are fused
together in a way that renders them inseparable.”24 Western culture promotes the idea that nature
can be dominated, that natural threats can be neutralized.25 But following Swyngedouw’s model,
the natural cannot be banished from the city. In the same vein, through networks of resource
extraction, cities are intricately linked to seemingly non-urban landscapes, and thus the urban
cannot be banished from the natural.
An economic interpretation of nature also predominates in Western culture. The
economic approach translates environmental values into dollar amounts, commodifies
environmental resources, and turns the impulse to conserve into an expression of consumer
preference. Theorist Langdon Winner offers an alternative, proposing a societal and
governmental adoption of an environmental ethic and philosophy which recognizes inherent and
moral value in nature.26 In the context of flooding, floodplains are more than potential pieces of
real estate with corresponding values. Flooding is not a problem that can be completely
26 Ibid., 125-127.
25 Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989): 123.
24 Erik Swyngedouw, “Modernity and Hybridity: Nature, Regeneracionismo, and the Production of the Spanish
Waterscape, 1890-1930,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 89, no. 3 (1999): 461.
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overcome through a well-engineered building. Our perspective of the nation’s flooding problem
must go beyond quantifications of cost, unwieldy, abstract measurements like the $95 billion in
damage from environmental disasters in 2020,27 which cannot claim to represent the devastation
of trauma, death, and destruction. Similarly, the question of whether flood buyout programs
make economic sense, or survive a cost-benefit analysis, is not irrelevant, but represents a
narrow understanding of the problem of flooding.
This thesis rests on a framework of political ecology, which recognizes the social,
political, and economic power dynamics that interact with ecological change. This perspective
recognizes the environmental destruction wrought by capitalism. Under capitalism, the long-term
viability of environmental resources is overlooked in favor of short-term profit. Unfortunately,
“the maximisation of profit is rarely environmentally benign.”28 The approach of political
ecology calls for the consideration of personal freedom, common good, and the role of
government. The philosopher T. H. Green wrote on the distinction between negative freedom, the
ability to be left alone to do what one wants, and positive freedom, which empowers one to
achieve something worthwhile. True freedom is not always freedom of choice but freedom from
choice. Thus, when the government imposes environmental restrictions, this can be seen as
granting a new freedom and acting in the best interests of citizens.29 In the context of flooding,
negative freedom is the ability to develop floodplains with reckless abandon, while the positive
freedom brought about by regulation is the ability to live without fear of flooding. Solving
environmental problems requires an multiscalar expansion of government authority, yet this need
not signify oppression, rather empowerment.30 An expansion of government authority on
30 Ibid., 111.
29 Ibid.,116-118, 123.
28 David Wells and Tony Lynch, The Political Ecologist (Michigan: Ashgate, 2000): 98-99.
27 Christopher Flavelle, “U.S. Disaster Costs Doubled in 2020, Reflecting Costs of Climate Change.” The New York
Times, January 7, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/climate/2020-disaster-costs.html.
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environmental issues is largely supported by the American public. A 2020 survey of public
opinion on climate change found that 75% of Americans believe that the federal government
should take action to reduce flood damage, while 72% support cooperation between federal and
state governments on flood policy.31 In addition to systemic political change, the political
ecology approach also calls for a reimagination of interpersonal relationships;
“If we wish to build the kind of sense of community which will be required to
solve our environmental problems then we must start to look at people in a
different way: not as the desperate preference maximisers in the competition of
all against all which is the ‘free’ market, but as potentially cooperative seekers
for common goods bound together in a social contract to avoid the kind of tragic
environmental, economic and social disasters which now face us all.”32
Environmental risk cannot be eliminated through individual action. It requires a collective effort,
which depends on strong communal ties. This connotes the rejection of prejudice and
marginalization, both on a structural, institution level, as well as on a personal level.
The practice of environmental justice is critical in addressing environmental problems.
Environmental degradation harms all, yet low-income households and people of color experience
far more exposure to environmental hazards than their white and wealthy counterparts. These
disparities have persisted, largely unchanged, despite widespread recognition of concepts of
environmental justice and environmental racism dating back to the late 1980s.33 The concept of
33 Spencer Banzhaf, Lala Ma, and Christopher Timmins. “Environmental Justice: The Economics of Race, Place,
and Pollution.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 33, no. 1 (2019): 189-190.
32 Wells and Lynch, The Political Ecologist, 142.
31 MacInnis and Krosnick, Climate Insights, 10.
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environmental justice rests on a set of key arguments and principles. First, all individuals have a
right to be protected from environmental degradation. Rather than reacting and recovering,
prevention of the environmental harm in the first place is the preferred strategy. The
environmental justice framework uses the Precautionary Principle, which originates from the
German sociological tradition. Instead of asking “How much harm is allowable?,” the
Precautionary Principle asks, “How little harm is possible?” Instead of individuals proving that
they have suffered harm, the environmental justice approach demands that corporations and
those producing risk prove that they do not harm. Finally, actions and resources to address
injustice are targeted for maximum impact and this targeting aims to correct previous
disparities.34 The concept of climate justice builds on environmental justice scholarship,
expanding a focus on place-based and local injustices to the broader spatial and temporal scales
on which climate change unfolds.35 Along with environmental justice, the concept of climate
justice is relevant in a discussion of flooding, as climate change brings increasing global
exposure to floods.
Across the United States, flooding disproportionately harms Black neighborhoods.36
Natural disasters themselves produce wealth inequality, particularly along lines of race,
education, and homeownership, not only because of physical damage, but because of the way
recovery resources are unequally designed and distributed.37 This creates a vicious cycle in
which disadvantaged residents of risky neighborhoods are more likely to experience a flood, will
suffer greater losses and receive less government support in comparison to their privileged
37 Junia Howell and James R. Elliott, “Damages Done: The Longitudinal Impacts of Natural Hazards on Wealth
Inequality in the United States,” Social Problems, vol. 66 (2019): 449.
36 Thomas Frank, “Flooding disproportionately harms black neighborhoods,” E&E News, June 2, 2020,
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063295449.
35 Kian Goh, “Urbanizing climate justice: constructing scales and politicising difference,” Cambridge Journal of
Regions, Economy and Society, vol. 13 (2020): 564.
34 Robert D. Bullard, The Quest for Environmental Justice: Human Rights and the Politics of Pollution (Sierra Club
Books, 2005), 25-29.
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counterparts, and their financial capacity to escape the risky neighborhood will be further
reduced. The task of remedying this injustice is immense, as governmental, legal, economic,
political, and military institutions all reinforce environmental racism.38 Since 2000, over 99.7%
of U.S. counties have experienced property damage from natural hazards, evidence of the way
environmental risk touches virtually all U.S. residents.39 Though all are affected, the lived
experience of flooding and flood recovery varies widely based on race. Thus, any discussion of
government flood policy requires an environmental justice orientation.
GOVERNMENTAL FLOOD POLICY
In practice, federal flood policy action has fallen short of the theoretical model of expansive
regulation presented in political ecology literature. Governmental responsibility has been
fragmented among a range of agencies and flood control action has been focused on
infrastructure and insurance, both imperfect tools to limit flooding. The 1916 floods along the
Mississippi River sparked authorization of the first federal flood control projects.40 At that time,
locally-managed levees were the primary method of flood control. During the 1920s, flooding
became a national concern and the Army Corps of Engineers began to study the problem on a
national scale, creating reports on more than 200 rivers. Finally, the Flood Control Act of 1936
affirmed that flood control was “a proper activity of the Federal Government” and “in the interest
of the general welfare.”41 The Act gave rise to 2,111 flood control projects in 31 states.42 The
Army Corps of Engineers was the nation’s lead flood control agency for decades, until the 1970s,
42 Ibid., 72.
41 Nelson M. Blake and Robert L. Izlar, “Flood Control and Drainage,” in The New Encyclopedia of Southern
Culture: Volume 8: Environment, ed. by Martin Melosi, 70-73,. North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press,
(2007): 72.
40 Ward, Floods, 142.
39 Howell and Elliott, “Damages Done,” 449.
38 Bullard, The Quest for Environmental Justice, 32.
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when other federal agencies like the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) became involved in flood
management. During its peak years, the “Big Dam Era,” the Corps demonstrated a longstanding
reliance on hard structures like levees and dams to control flooding. In the ensuing decades,
many of these structures have fallen into disrepair, and others have been found to actually
increase flood damage when met with an extreme amount of floodwater that cannot be
contained. Many levees are not constructed to deal with the 100-year flood (a measurement of a
magnitude of flooding with a 1% probability of occurring in a given year) nor have they been
designed to take climate change predictions into account.43 Existing infrastructural solutions
remain insufficient to meet current and future flood risk calculations.
In the late 20th century, insurance became the primary federal tool for limiting
floodplain development. Two influential 1966 studies argued for flood insurance as a means to
control overdevelopment of floodplains, representing an approach that relies on the free market
to make floodplain development undesirable based on cost. Two years later the National Flood
Insurance Act was passed, creating the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).44 Today, the
NFIP has grown to become the largest hazard insurer in the United States.45 Under this program,
FEMA identifies hazard areas and corresponding degrees of risk, establishes construction
criteria, and sets flood insurance premium rates. State and local governments collaborate on
floodplain development regulations and flood insurance becomes available once the local
government adopts regulations that meet NFIP standards. Private insurers provide the insurance
policies.46 For the first 26 years of the program, the NFIP had the option of purchasing insured
46 Burby, “Flood insurance and floodplain management,” 111-112.
45 Howell and Elliott, “Damages Done,”  451.
44 Raymond J. Burby, “Flood insurance and floodplain management: the US experience,” Environmental Hazards,
vol. 3 (2001): 111-112.
43 A. Dan Tarlock and Deborah M. Chizewer, “Living With Water in a Climate-Changed World: Will Federal Flood
Policy Sink or Swim?” Environmental Law, vol. 46, no. 3 (2016): 501-504.
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properties that had been substantially or repeatedly damaged and transfer the property ownership
to a public agency, and 1,400 properties were purchased this way. However, the 1994 revision to
the NFIP removed this power.47 The year 1994 saw substantial federal action on flood control
after the devastating Great Midwest Floods of 1993. Congress expanded federal authority to
promote retreat through property acquisition, which catalyzed the creation of more local buyout
programs,48 even as property acquisition was dropped from the National Flood Insurance Act.
The 1994 amendment to the Act added a Community Rating System, which classifies local
government mitigation efforts and awards active mitigation with better flood insurance rates.
Additional mitigation incentives in the 1994 amendment consisted of the newly created Flood
Mitigation Fund, a source of grants to states and local governments, and the reward of extra
NFIP coverage for bringing buildings into compliance.49
One success of the NFIP was that it stimulated local government management of
floodplains. Through new building standards, the NFIP has also reduced the flood damage of
new construction in floodplains. However, overall the program has had many shortcomings and
unintended consequences, beginning with the “Herculean” task of mapping all flood hazard areas
in the U.S. and keeping these maps up to date.50 Keeping the program affordable while funding a
massive mapping effort proved a difficult balance. Many communities participated in the
program lacking accurate maps and therefore lacking insurance rates that truly represented risk.
The FEMA maps that were completed often didn’t have enough detail to be used by local
planning departments for their own flood mitigation efforts, a missed opportunity to foster more
local action. Though the NFIP required local governments to restrict floodplain development, it
50 Ibid., 114.
49 Burby, “Flood insurance and floodplain management,” 114-117.
48 A. R. Siders, “Social justice implications of US managed retreat buyout programs,” Climatic Change, vol. 152
(2019): 240.
47 Burby, “Flood insurance and floodplain management,” 113-114.
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did not force them to use zoning or any other measures to do so.51 As for the Community Rating
System, critics point out that it financially disadvantages people whose local government is
inactive on flood control.52
Though the NFIP was designed to deter development, it also guaranteed flood coverage
in areas that private developers had deemed too risky, thus encouraging construction in these
places.53 In the 30 years after the implementation of the NFIP, the country saw a 53% increase in
floodplain development, suggesting that the program has, in effect, subsidized development, not
deterred it.54 Recent data confirms that floodplain development has not turned a corner since.55
The NFIP has also run into problems with repetitive loss properties. About 10% of all repeatedly
flooded properties have received payments worth more than their value. Some properties have
received insurance payoffs nearly ten times the building’s value in aggregate. Staggeringly
expensive repetitive loss properties include a 300-unit apartment building in Roanoke Valley,
Virginia, which has cost more than $10.5 million over 9 years, and a Mississippi home worth
$69,000, which has flooded 34 times in 32 years, resulting in $663,000 in claims. These cases
are outliers, but current trends indicate that the number of repeatedly flooded properties has been
increasing by 5,000 annually, meaning that extremely expensive outliers will become more
common.56
Lastly, two other major flaws prevent the NFIP from functioning as it should. First, a gap
in public awareness about flood risk means that many property owners don’t have flood
56 PEW, “Repeatedly Flooded Properties Cost Billions,” PEW Charitable Trusts, October 6, 2016,
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/data-visualizations/2016/repeatedly-fLooded-properties-cost-bil
lions, accessed April 27, 2021.
55 Flavelle, “Homes Are Being Built the Fastest.”
54 Burby, “Flood insurance and floodplain management,” 116-118.
53 Christopher Flavelle, “Early Biden Climate Test: Groups Demand Tougher Rules on Building.” The New York
Times, January 6, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/climate/flood-zone-building-restrictions.html.
52 Freudenberg et al., Buy-In for Buyouts, 11.
51 Ibid., 113-115.
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insurance and underestimate its importance. Over a 30-year mortgage, a property located in the
100-year floodplain has a 26% chance of flooding, but a 1% chance of suffering fire damage, yet
95% of homeowners have fire insurance, while estimates suggest that only 20% of homeowners
required to carry flood insurance actually do so, indicating a substantial misperception of flood
risk.57 Secondly, on a more fundamental level, insurance is designed to restore wealth. Those
who do not own property are not poised to benefit from a system that relies on insurance to
support recovery from natural disasters.58 Even without the logistical flaws of the NFIP, inequity
is a built-in part of this policy tool.
Recent years have seen a series of flood policies and subsequent reversals during the
Obama and Trump administrations. On President Biden’s first day in office, he signed an
executive order to raise construction standards on buildings or infrastructure in flood zones built
with federal money, an order first implemented under Obama, then reversed under Trump.
FEMA has announced plans to reallocate a portion of disaster spending to protect against climate
disasters. Pending approval from the White House Budget Office, these plans would increase
climate-resilience funding more than six-fold, with as much as $10 billion in funding possibly
available for programs such as the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities Program
(BRIC) and the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), the latter of which funds floodplain
buyouts.59 Technological advancements in mapping and monitoring flooding have illuminated
new tools for addressing flood risk in recent years.60 The federal government is poised to act on
flood mitigation and adaptation, ready to abandon a strategy that relies only on insurance and
levees. Still, buyouts remain a product of local governmental action and are often seen as pilot
60 Freudenberg et al., Buy-In for Buyouts,  11.
59 Christopher Flavelle, “New U.S. Strategy Would Quickly Free Billions in Climate Funds,” The New York Times,
January 25, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/25/climate/fema-climate-spending-biden.html.
58 Howell and Elliott, “Damages Done,” 452.
57 Burby, “Flood insurance and floodplain management,” 116-118.
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programs, despite not being new. A federal approach to comprehensive floodplain regulation and
buyout programs remains unrealized.
BUYOUT COMPLICATIONS
Floodplain buyouts are no straightforward silver bullet to the nation’s flooding problem.
Criticism of these programs tends to center around three general areas of concern: the financial
impact of buyout programs on local governments, the individual psychological harm of
displacement, and the larger political ramifications of these programs. Beginning with concerns
in local government, some officials express reluctance to implement buyout programs because
they place an extra financial burden on local governments. Additionally, officials anticipate
losing property tax revenue through buyouts, though the actual loss trends to be less than
expected and is offset by avoided future costs.61 In areas where affordable housing is in short
supply, buyouts remove housing stock, creating a potential conflict with local government
housing objectives. These concerns can prevent local adoption of buyout programs even in
flood-prone areas with community support of buyouts.
For the individual participant in a buyout program, the challenge of losing a home and
embarking on a potentially difficult housing search should not be underestimated. FEMA-funded
buyouts tend to take 7-18 months62 and housing instability over this long period of time can
cause considerable stress. Relocation removes people from their communities and support
networks, which can be particularly difficult for the elderly and people of color, populations that
are historically often targeted for forced relocation.63 Buyout planning must include careful
63 Siders, “Social justice implications,” 241.
62 Ibid., 3.
61 Freudenberg et al., Buy-In for Buyouts,  38.
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consideration of where participants will eventually end up and whether the receiving site meets
participants’ needs.
Accounts from North Dakota and Louisiana reveal the various roadblocks and difficulties
of the relocation process for both planners and participants. In Grand Forks, North Dakota, the
local government partnered with a developer to build 180 receiving homes after a buyout of 802
properties in the late 1990s. The new homes were expensive, isolated from the city, and had no
school district. As a result, only 12 out of 180 sold in the first three years, a colossal failure in
meeting the needs of relocating buyout participants.64 In 2018, Louisiana officials attempted to
relocate about 40 predominately Black homeowners from Pecan Acres, a subdivision that had
flooded 17 times since the 1970s. However, the effort stalled when residents of a nearby
predominately white town blocked the sale of undeveloped land meant to house Pecan Acres
relocatees. The white residents raised the racist argument that the move would cause their
property values to decline.65 This appalling story demonstrates how racism constricts the
movement of Black people in America. Relocation is not a neutral process nor is it experienced
the same way by everyone. While relocation protects an individual from flood risk, other harms
can be introduced and the process itself can be stressful and traumatic. Buyouts must be designed
to support participants throughout the process, and to preserve an individual’s sense of stability
and belonging in a community, even when their address changes.
Finally, the last critique of buyout programs questions the model of relocation and its
oppressive political formations, informed by American political, social, and historical contexts.
The brutal forced relocations of Indigenous people, with the most widely-known example of the
Trail of Tears, can be seen as predecessors to today’s government-supported relocations.66 In
66 Ibid., 13184.
65 Carey, “Managed retreat increasingly seen as necessary,” 13185.
64 Freudenberg et al., Buy-In for Buyouts,  27.
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more recent history, the racist legacy of urban renewal casts a shadow over programs that aim to
relocate communities of color, even when the relocation is designed in the name of protection.
Furthermore, some suggest that buyout programs reinvent the racist practice of redlining, which
deemed investment in Black neighborhoods as too risky for banks, because buyouts contribute to
the creation of  “zones of disinvestment” in neighborhoods facing flood risk, where people of
color often live.67 The danger is that buyout programs, rather than empowering individuals to
escape flood risk, can become instruments of urban governance meant to protect, maintain, or
further consolidate economic power and territorial control. These programs have the potential to
threaten marginalized communities’ “right to the city,” a concept originating from the
scholarship of Henri Lefebvre and expanded on by geographer David Harvey. In the context of
ecological risk and climate change, the “right to the city” describes the right of marginalized
people facing environmental hazards to maintain claims on space in cities.68 While the
voluntariness of most buyout programs would seem to affirm the autonomy and rights of
participants, these participants do not always perceive voluntary programs as voluntary, and
many experience pressure to sell their homes.69 Legacies of oppression and racist land-use
planning and urban planning give reason to critically examine the power dynamics and social
justice implications of buyout programs. Buyouts will be most successful and most empowering
if they proceed with strong grassroots support. However, strong grassroots support requires
organizing power and political connections to realize community-driven plans, which
low-income communities and communities of color may lack. Thus, creating a buyout program
that is community-driven, minimizes stress and harm to its participants, adequately resolves
69 de Vries and Fraser, “Citizenship rights and voluntary decision making,” 21.
68 Goh, “Urbanizing climate justice,” 564.
67 Freudenberg et al., Buy-In for Buyouts, 40.
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environmental risk, and operates on principles of equity and antiracism is no straightforward
task.
CHARLOTTE AND HOUSTON
Though buyout programs have existed across the U.S. for nearly five decades, little
standardization exists among them. FEMA funding criteria creates some cohesion, but not all
buyout programs are funded through FEMA grants. I situate my study of floodplain buyout
programs in two cities: Houston, Texas and Charlotte, North Carolina. Through comparing these
two programs, I seek to indicate the variability that exists between the hundreds of flood buyout
programs that exist in the U.S. The buyout programs in Houston and Charlotte are two of the
oldest and most established programs in the nation. My comparative analysis of these two
programs reveals how differences in program priorities, design, and features influence the impact
these programs have on communities.
Both Houston and Charlotte are large Sun Belt cities experiencing significant population
growth and prone to a sprawling, unregulated pattern of development, where real estate and
finance industries contribute significantly to the local economy. Houston and Charlotte are
distinctly Southern cities. The South carries a legacy of entrenched white supremacy, yet it is
also the region that birthed the Civil Rights Movement and the environmental justice movement,
and thus is an important region for examining environmental racism.70 Residents of Houston and
Charlotte fall victim to riverine flooding along miles of bayous, rivers, and creeks that wind
through suburban and densely developed areas. The fact that both cities experience primarily
inland flooding makes them useful settings in which to study flood risk from an environmental
justice perspective, because inland flood risk tends to be more correlated with social
70 Bullard, “Differential Vulnerabilities,” 754.
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disadvantage, in comparison to coastal flood zones, where the wealthy and white often live.71
However, flooding in Houston and Charlotte is not exclusively riverine; both cities experience
flooding from coastal hurricanes and tropical storms, a larger risk for Houston due to its
proximity to the Gulf of Mexico. Buyout programs have been in place in both cities for over two
decades, with Houston’s dating back to 1985,72 while Charlotte’s buyout program began in
1999.73 Both programs are examples of long-term, citywide buyouts operating alongside an
urbanism that tends to avoid regulation.
Contrasts between the Houston and Charlotte buyout programs demonstrate the multiple
ways buyouts can function in different urban environments. Houston’s floodplain buyout
program is substantially larger than Charlotte’s, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of
population. In Houston, over 3,500 properties have been acquired by the government,
encompassing 1,300 acres, and relocating thousands of individuals and households.74 It is the
largest buyout program in the US. Meanwhile acquired properties in Charlotte number less than
500, correlating to 185 acres of green space.75 Charlotte’s program is distinctive not for its size
but for its local funding structure, which emancipates the program from FEMA buyout funding
criteria and allows for flexibility and local control over the process. The buyout process moves
faster in Charlotte and program features allow for an easier participant experience in comparison
to Houston’s program. Community support and organizing have been important in the founding
of the Charlotte program. Within the past few years, Harris County, which contains most of the
city of Houston, has begun considering the “social vulnerability” of communities waiting to
75 “Floodplain Buyout (Acquisition) Program,” City of Charlotte.
https://charlottenc.gov/StormWater/Flooding/Pages/FloodplainBuyoutProgram.aspx. (accessed January 8, 2021).
74 “Home Buyout Program,” HCFCD.
73 Mary DeAngelis, “County Plans for Flood Plains.” The Charlotte Observer, April 7, 1999, p. 1C.
72 “Home Buyout Program.” Harris County Flood Control District, accessed October 20, 2020.
https://www.hcfcd.org/Resilience/Countywide-or-Multi-Watershed/Home-Buyout-Program.
71 Jayajit Chakraborty, Timothy W. Collins, and Sara E. Grineski, “Exploring the Environmental Justice Implications
of Hurricane Harvey Flooding in Greater Houston, Texas,” AJPH, vol. 109, no. 2 (2019): 244.
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receive funding for flood control projects, in an effort to put theories of environmental justice
into practice. Charlotte’s program has no stated commitment to address social justice concerns.
In later chapters, this thesis explores the link between the design and evolution of these programs
and their differing social impacts.
CONCLUSION
The relocation of Niobrara pioneered a new strategy of managed retreat from flooding, a strategy
gaining public, governmental, and scientific support in recent years. Enacting the strategy of
managed retreat requires an acceptance of flooding as a man-made disaster, caused by unchecked
development of floodplains. This strategy demands a relinquishing of the belief that human
ingenuity can out-maneuver nature. The U.S. currently faces growing flood risk as development
spreads across floodplains and climate change promises to bring sea level rise and more frequent
and intense storms. Floodplain buyouts offer a tool for addressing this crisis, a tool to augment
the current U.S. flood control strategy, which depends primarily on a problematic insurance
system and insufficient infrastructure projects. Still, the question remains as to whether the
successful relocation of a few hundred Nebraskans can be successfully replicated in large urban
centers, which come with distinct cultural and political contexts. Given that relocation strains
communities and individuals, the social impact of these programs is a critical consideration in a
judgement of success or failure of the program. The cities of Houston and Charlotte provide
settings in which to consider the implementation of large, ongoing flood buyout programs. The
second chapter of this thesis locates and contextualizes the Houston buyout program, while the
third chapter introduces Charlotte’s program. The consequences of each buyout and their social
justice implications are discussed in the fourth chapter. Chapter five concludes with a look at the
23
nationwide influence of the two programs and their unrealized potential. Throughout each
chapter, I question how vulnerability is constructed and addressed in the deregulated city.
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CHAPTER 2. HOUSTON
Figure 1. The city of Houston, with Harris County outlined in red. Source: Google Maps,
adapted by the author.
Houston, the fourth most populated city in the United States, has long been the “planless city.”
The city has no traditional zoning, resulting in oddly mixed land use, with churches across from
massage parlors, and large swaths of undeveloped land scattered throughout the city, yet
relatively little public space and parkland. The scholarly literature often calls Houston the
“free-enterprise city,” driven by the capitalist market and unrestrained by government regulation.
The city maintains a good business climate, meaning low taxes, limited public services, a
probusiness government, and low wages.76 Sustained population growth and development serve
76 Joe R. Feagin, Free Enterprise City: Houston in Political-Economic Perspective (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1988), 16.
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as evidence of the city’s success. Among all North American cities, Houston has experienced
some of the most sustained growth, from a population of 2,396 in 185077 to over 2.1 million in
2010. The 1850 city boundaries have expanded from a nucleus of nine square miles to
encompass over 630 square miles.78 From 2001 to 2010 Houston had the largest urban growth
and fifth largest population growth in the United States.79 The Greater Houston metropolitan area
has a population of 5.9 million80 and generates 30% of Texas GDP. One-fifth of all Texas jobs are
located in Harris County, which encompasses nearly all of the city, and the headquarters of 18
Fortune 500 companies are located in the county.81 Because of its size and economic activity,
Houston is an important city within Texas and in the country as a whole.
Houston is also a diverse city. Early Houston was built around a plantation economy, and
the city’s early wealth and growth depended on slave labor.82 As a result, the city has long had a
substantial Black population. Today, at 24% of the city’s population,83 Black Houstonias are the
largest Black community in the south.84 Hispanic immigration into Houston began in the early
20th century and increased substantially after World War II. From 1970 to 1980 Houston’s
Hispanic population increased 60%85 and as of 2010 nearly half of the city’s residents are
Hispanic or Latinx.86 The city has a legacy of racial segregation, with majority Black and
Hispanic neighborhoods receiving far poorer public services and lacking infrastructural support.
Though immigration has continuously fed Houston’s growth, the city has no immigrant political
86 U.S. Census Bureau, “QuickFacts Houston city, Texas.”
85 Feagin, Free Enterprise City, 254 & 258.
84 Bullard, The Quest for Environmental Justice, 44.
83 U.S. Census Bureau, “QuickFacts Houston city, Texas.”
82 Feagin, Free Enterprise City, 241.
81 “Hurricane Harvey: Impact and Response in Harris County” (Houston: Harris County Flood Control District,
2018), 15.
80 U.S. Census Bureau, “QuickFacts Houston city, Texas,” accessed November 16, 2020, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/houstoncitytexas.
79 Zhang et al. “Urbanization exacerbated the rainfall,” 384.
78 Bullard, The Quest for Environmental Justice, 43.
77 Feagin, Free Enterprise City, 7.
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machines and it is rare that major grassroots input factors into local political decisions.87
Ensuring political representation and government accountability remains an ongoing battle for
Houston’s residents of color.
This chapter explores how Houston’s laissez faire approach to urban planning, in addition
to population growth, has driven the overdevelopment of Houston’s floodplains, resulting in
damaging floods. Reflecting the magnitude of Houston’s flooding problem, the city’s buyout
program is one of the largest in the U.S. The size of the program, along with its consideration of
social vulnerability in buyout implementation, makes it a trailblazing example of a U.S. buyout
program. Still, many Houstonians remain at risk from floods due to governmental reluctance to
regulate developers and this situation continues to increase demand for a large-scale buyout
program.
URBAN PLANNING IN THE FREE ENTERPRISE CITY
Houston’s government is ruled by the business elite, whose decisions have long shaped the city.
Their influence in local government can be traced back to the 1860s, when the city experienced a
municipal debt crisis resulting from infrastructure spending on projects such as the dredging of
Buffalo Bayou to create a better ship canal. Born out of this crisis was an approach to city
governance that focused on business corridors, neglected residential areas, and emphasized the
profitability and expansion of the private sector as the first priority of government. Either
directly or indirectly, the business leadership in Houston has determined the broad contours of
infrastructure development and in planning decisions they often met with the mayor before the
city council did. Houston’s political leaders have often built their careers in business, especially
in real estate. For example, Oscar Holcomb, an entrepreneur and developer, served eleven
87 Feagin, Free Enterprise City, 245 & 149.
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mayoral terms from 1921 to 1958 and, incidentally, was also a member of the Houston’s Klu
Klux Klan Chapter. It is not purely free market forces that shape Houston, but free enterprise, as
demonstrated by the influence of business interests in shaping government decisions.
Federal spending and regulation have also enabled Houston’s development. Throughout its
history, the city has benefitted from federal aid for major infrastructure projects, capital for
petrochemical companies, and regulation of oil field competition.88 Local government spending
is limited in Houston, but the city’s small government, capitalist approach incorporates federal
support and operates not under the direction of the invisible hand but under that of the
businessman.
Louie Welch, Houston’s mayor from 1964 to 1973, once claimed that “the free market
place has functioned in Houston like no other place in America. It has a method of purging itself
of slums. No city is without poor people, but the opportunity not to be poor is greater than in
most cities.”89 Proponents of the free enterprise ideology argue that Houston’s sprawl and lack of
regulation keep land and housing prices low, creating economic and social mobility, which
allows the city to accommodate newcomers, including the poor and disenfranchised.90 Still,
though Welch suggests otherwise, poverty is a significant problem in Houston, along with other
major urban problems such as flooding, water pollution, toxic waste, air quality, and traffic
congestion. These problems disproportionately affect low income residents and Black and
Hispanic Houstonians and suggest that Houston’s government has prioritized profit over
livability, leading to the question of whether “unrestrained capitalistic development and a
first-rate quality of life may be incompatible in a modern city.”91 The power crisis in February
91 Feagin, Free Enterprise City, 212 & 237.
90 Robert Bruegmann, Sprawl: A Compact History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 218.
89 Ibid., 260.
88 Feagin, Free Enterprise City.
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2021, which left millions of Texans without heat, electricity, or safe drinking water for multiple
days, brought on by a rare winter storm, is evidence of the dangers of deregulation and
privatization of energy infrastructure, which has occurred across the whole state, not just in
Houston.92 A complete picture of Houston not only presents its dominant free enterprise ideology
but also explores the social and environmental costs of such an ideology.
Houston’s planning agencies are weak, lacking both personnel and funding. The
weakness of the City Planning Department creates a vacuum in long-range planning and
infrastructure, which then must be taken on by other planning agencies, such as the Texas
Highway Department and the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD). A private
engineering firm has been responsible for developing Houston’s primary water and sewer plans,
as well as restructuring the city’s tax structure and planning for the city’s airports, in
collaboration with other firms.93 Sociologist Joe Feagin wryly comments that Houston has no
public-private partnerships, rather private-public ones.94 Though Houston’s public infrastructure
is historically underdeveloped, the environment for construction is quite favorable, with faster
project development timelines than most other major cities. Development occurs quickly because
Houston developers face less red tape, with an absence of zoning and weak enforcement of the
ordinances and codes that do restrain development.95
Over the course of Houston’s history, multiple attempts have been made to implement a
zoning code. In 1930 Will C. Hog, chair of the newly created City Planning Commission, tried to
bring zoning laws to Houston, largely motivated by the threat of mixed-use encroachments on
elite residential areas. Real estate developers mobilized 350 residents to protest zoning at city
95 Feagin, Free Enterprise City, 63; 161.
94 167.
93 Feagin, Free Enterprise City, 163.
92 Robinson Meyer, “Texas Failed Because It Did Not Plan,” The Atlantic, February 12, 2021,
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2021/02/what-went-wrong-texas/618104/.
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council hearings and successfully defeated Hog’s attempt. A similar fate befell the following
three attempts to instate zoning in 1938, 1947, and 1962. In 1947, a full-page advertisement
rather dramatically called on the public to “kill this legalistic monster, spawned in Europe and
disguised in the slum-ridden eastern cities as a device to protect your homes.”96 Importantly,
Houston’s opposition to zoning is not simply a reflection of the city’s spirit of “individualism,”
but the result of concentrated organizing efforts by real estate groups. In the place of zoning,
Houston development is regulated through deed restrictions and land price. Deed restrictions are
widely implemented--in the 1970s an estimated 10,000 deed instruments covered about
two-thirds of the city. These deed restrictions tend to be ill-enforced and are often ignored if the
property owner has little power to take on a developer. Developers also have the option of
buying out property owners and voting to change deed restrictions. Ordinances enacted in the
1980s, which governed such things as the length of blocks and the location of porn shops, have
also served as a weak stand-in for true zoning.97 Without zoning, those without political clout
have few tools with which to fend off unwanted development or industrial encroachment.
Developers take the path of least resistance, which often leads through low income or majority
Black and brown neighborhoods.98 To the detriment of many Houstonians, developers have free
reign.
However, Houstonians have mounted powerful organizing efforts against unwanted
development in the name of protecting their neighborhoods. In the 1970s, Black Houstonians
protested the locations of the city’s waste disposal sites, the vast majority of which had been
placed in Black and Hispanic neighborhoods. After successfully closing the Kirkpatrick Landfill
in 1971, protestors focused their energy against the proposed Whispering Pines Sanitary Landfill,
98 Bullard, The Quest for Environmental Justice, 45 & 60.
97 Ibid., 159-160 & 172.
96 Feagin, Free Enterprise City, 157-158.
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which would be located within 1,400 feet of Smiley High School in the 82% Black neighborhood
of Northwood Manor. A mere decade earlier, when the neighborhood was majority white,
residents had successfully halted an earlier landfill plan. The Northeast Community Action
Group charged the corporation responsible for the landfill with racial discrimination in its site
selection and the resulting class action lawsuit, Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp
eventually reached the U.S. District Court in 1984. The judge ruled against the Northwood
Manor residents, and the landfill was built. However, Bean v. Southwestern Waste remains a
milestone in the environmental justice movement as a watershed case, one that predates many
other milestones in the movement. The case charged environmental discrimination under the
Civil Rights Act, and in doing so, created a new legal methodology and theory of environmental
discrimination. Bean v. Southwestern Waste also galvanized and politicized part of black Houston
to fight against the intentional neglect of their neighborhoods.99 The struggle over landfill sites
thus had far reaching effects in contributing to a budding movement for environmental justice
and in providing a blueprint for resistance against Houston’s discriminatory urban planning.
FLOODING AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE BAYOU CITY
Houston’s growth, underdeveloped infrastructure, and limited government regulation and
spending have created numerous major urban problems for the city, such as air pollution, toxic
waste pollution, traffic congestion, unsafe drinking water, and lastly flooding,100 which is the
city’s most immediate natural hazard. Known as the “Bayou City,” Houston is criss-crossed by
2,500 of natural bayous and manmade channels, which drain into Galveston Bay. Environmental
characteristics that contribute to Houston’s flood threat consist of a high average annual rainfall
100 Feagin, Free Enterprise City, 6.
99 Bullard, The Quest for Environmental Justice, 54-58.
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of 45 inches, flat topography, impermeable clay soils, and proximity to tropical storms in the
Gulf of Mexico.101 Houston experiences three types of floods: flash floods, riverine floods, and
tidal floods, and these floods have the potential to occur every year in every season.102 Houston
has also experienced subsidence, which occurs as water and oil are pumped out of the ground
and the soils compact.103 Subsidence increases flood risk not only through submerging land, but
also because it disrupts collector drains, irrigation ditches, and the flow of creeks and bayous.104
The threat of flooding has been magnified through unchecked urban development.
Between 1992 and 2010, Harris County lost an estimated 15,855 acres of its natural freshwater
wetlands to urban development, which made up nearly a third of the county’s total acreage of
wetlands.105 Houston’s high parking requirements, believed to create 30 parking spaces per
Houstonian, and the city’s characteristic sprawl, which pushes developers into the prairies and
wetlands bordering its suburbs, both contribute to the vast amount of impervious land in the city.
In 2006, Houston City Council prohibited new construction and repairs to homes in the 100-year
flood zones along the city’s bayous. However, in 2008 the restriction was retracted under
pressure from homeowners, and since then over 7,000 units have been developed added in these
areas.106 Geographer Roy Ward’s statement that “flood disasters are man made in that man has
put himself at risk by developing floodplains” rings true in Houston where planning problems
combine with natural characteristics to produce regular flooding disasters.107
107 Ward, Floods, 2.
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Houston experienced devastating floods in 1929 and 1935, prompting the city to ask
Congress for federal flood control assistance, which was granted. In 1937 the Texas legislature
created the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD), governed by the Harris County
Commissioners Court.108 The next major flood occurred in 1949 and cost $5 million in damages.
By the 1970s and 1980s, average annual flooding losses reached more than $30 million. In 1979
two floods in July and September cost a combined $108 million. An area known as Southwest
Meyerland experienced six major floods from 1973-1983. A year later fed-up homeowners
collectively sold their homes to a development firm which was expanding a nearby shopping
mall, a private sector predecessor to the later government buyouts. A flood in June of 1987 killed
one person and severely damaged 250 houses. As the 1980s wore on, an increase in the number
and intensity of floods was noted, along with an increase in the number of flood victims.109 In the
last 50 years, Harris County has had the highest number of flood-related fatalities in the United
States.110 Restriction of floodplain development was too interventionist for the business elite, but
the HCFCD addressed the flooding problem through channel modifications and requiring the
construction of detention ponds where drainage systems were overloaded. In 1984 a chamber
task force proposed a $922 million program to improve drainage, which would be implemented
over the next 25 years, representing a major step forward in long-range planning.111
It was within this context that Houston’s voluntary flood buyout program was conceived
and enacted in 1985. Since then, more than 3,500 properties have been purchased, allowing for
the restoration of nearly 2,000 acres to their natural floodplain state, with an additional 650
buyouts in progress as of September 2020. Millions of dollars in potential flood damages have
111 Feagin, Free Enterprise City, 229.
110 Wesley E. Highfield, Sarah A. Norman, and Samuel D. Brody. “Examining the 100-Year Floodplain as a Metric
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been avoided. Harris County’s buyout program is productive in scale, but progress is slow for
participating property owners. A buyout may take eight to twelve months to get underway, and
the entire process often takes place over years. Beyond single-family homes, commercial
buildings, multi-family residences, churches, and even structureless properties can receive
buyouts, though residential residences are prioritized. Still, many properties do not qualify for a
buyout, as buyouts are reserved for properties that cannot be protected through structural
modifications or flood mitigation projects. The Harris County Flood Control District must
determine that a buyout is a cost effective solution to the flooding problem and the property must
also meet varying requirements of the federal funding source. In Harris County, home buyouts
are funded through grants from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Property owners are paid either the
current fair market value of the home or the pre-flood market value, determined by an
independent appraiser. Some property owners are also eligible for relocation assistance, which
covers moving costs and supplements rental payments. Once the buyout is completed, all
structures are removed from the land, utilities are capped, and the property returns to a natural
state or is developed as a park. A deed restriction prevents any future private development of the
property.112
SOCIAL VULNERABILITY: A POST-HARVEY APPROACH TO FLOOD MANAGEMENT
Houston’s flood management approach was severely tested by Hurricane Harvey, a Category 4
Hurricane which dumped an average 47.4 inches of rain on the city from August 25th to 29th,
2017. The deluge, typically Houston’s total annual rainfall now condensed into a few days,
overwhelmed the banks of every one of the city’s 22 bayous. An estimated 154,170 structures
112 Ibid.
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flooded. Approximately 37,000 people were relocated to shelters113 and 70 lives were lost.114 The
damage from Hurricane Harvey was record-breaking; nationally, it is the second most expensive
natural disaster after Hurricane Katrina.115 This damage was not distributed evenly across the
city. Instead the extent of Harvey-induced flooding was found to be correlated with race,
ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, meaning that poor Black and Hispanic Houstonians faced
the brunt of the flooding.116 Analyses of Harvey confirm that urbanization amplified the storm
through a phenomenon in which surface roughness of urban land induces drag on a storm
system,117 a finding which emphasizes the human role in constructing natural disasters. In west
Houston, 14,000 homes had been built inside the Addick’s Reservoir, a project dating back to the
1940s, when the area was open prairie. Of these 14,000 unfortunately located homes, over 5,000
flooded as a result of Hurricane Harvey,118 a striking example of the consequences of unregulated
development, which also reveals the shortcomings of large infrastructural flood control projects
when not paired with land-use regulation. Climate change was projected to have made Harvey’s
flooding event between 1.5 and 5 times more likely. By 2100, Harvey’s rainfall is estimated to
have a return period of 100 years.119 The potential for Houston to face increasingly frequent
Harvey-like storms as a result of climate change underscores the urgency of improving the city’s
flood management approach, an approach which insufficiently protects Black, Hispanic, and
poor Houstonians and which is undermined by unregulated development. Hurricane Harvey had
the effect of galvanizing a forward-looking conversation on planning, infrastructure,
vulnerability, and resiliency in Houston.
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In the summer of 2018, one year after Hurricane Harvey, Harris County voters approved
a $2.5 billion bond to fund over 500 flood control projects, the largest initiative in county history.
In November, Democrats gained a majority in Harris County Commission and took control of the
bond’s implementation. Two years after Hurricane Harvey, the Harris County Commision passed
a new prioritization framework for evaluating and funding flood control projects. The new
approach passed on a party line vote, with the three Democratic commissioners, all people of
color, opposing the two white Republican commissioners.120 The framework consisted of eight
measures for evaluating projects: flood risk reduction, drainage capacity of channels relevant to a
project, Social Vulnerability Index, project efficiency, partnership funding, long term
maintenance costs, minimization of environmental impacts, and potential for multiple benefits.
Though seven out of the eight metrics had been used before, the Social Vulnerability
Index (SVI) was a new and controversial addition. The SVI is a measurement of the resilience of
a population group; its capacity to anticipate, confront, repair, and recover from a natural
disaster. This perspective acknowledges that recovery is not determined solely by the
environmental severity of a disaster and that populations are not affected equally by disaster.
Socially vulnerable communities experience higher rates of mortality, morbidity, property
destruction, and are less likely to fully recover from disaster. The SVI was created by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 2006,121 building on the work of the geographer
Susan Cutter,122 and consists of a database and mapping tool for use by local, state, and tribal
disaster management officials in identifying locations of their vulnerable communities. The SVI
122 Susan L. Cutter, “Vulnerability to environmental hazards,” Progress in Human Geography, vol. 20, no. 4 (1996).
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attempts to numerically represent vulnerability through a score based on fifteen census
metrics.123
Figure 2. Census variables included in the Social Vulnerability Index. Adapted from
Flanagan, 2018, p. 5.
Not only was the Social Vulnerability Index a new addition to the project evaluation
framework used to allocate funding for flood control projects, it was also weighted heavily, at
approximately 20%, surpassed only by flood risk reduction, weighted at 25%.124 The
incorporation of the Social Vulnerability Index departed from a strictly “worst-first” model of
124 Shawn Arrajj, “Harris County adopts ‘worst-first’ guidelines for remaining flood bond projects.” Community
Impact Newspaper, August 28, 2019. https://communityimpact.com/houston/city-county/2019/08/28/harris-county-
adopts-worst-first-guidelines-for-remaining-flood-bond-projects/
123 Flanagan, “Measuring Community Vulnerability,” 34-36.
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project implementation, provoking outcry from wealthier Houstonians who felt they had been
bumped down the list though they faced flood risk.125 Republican Commissioner Jack Cagle
criticized the SVI, saying “Water didn’t care whether you are of a wealthy neighborhood or a
poor neighborhood. Water didn’t care how much education you had. It found the lowest spot. I
think we’re getting away from science and we’re getting into other issues.”126 Dave Martin,
Houston’s mayor pro tem, maintained that the 2018 bond measure would never have passed had
voters anticipated the inclusion of the SVI.127 The original language of the bond called for the
“equitable expenditure of funds… since flooding issues do not respect jurisdictional or political
boundaries.”128 To many Houstonians, the new framework disregarded equity in favor of political
aims, specifically the funneling of flood control funding to democrat-leaning voters.
However, the city’s previous approach to flood control was anything but equitable. Flood
control funding was allocated following the logic that areas with higher property values yielded
more of a return on the investment.129 The city had more to lose in property tax revenue if these
areas were damaged by flooding, in comparison to lower income areas.130 Reports surfaced of
public employees being sent to wealthy neighborhoods to improve gutters to accommodate
runoff from newly installed swimming pools. Meanwhile, low-income neighborhoods and
communities of color faced infrastructural neglect. The new framework, a test case for
addressing racial inequity and environmental risk together, was informed by these past
injustices.131
131 Flavelle, “A Climate Plan in Texas.”
130 Hansen, “‘Social Vulnerability Index”
129 Flavelle, “A Climate Plan in Texas.”
128 Holly Hansen, “‘Social Vulnerability Index Will Factor Into Prioritizing Harris County Flood Risk Reduction.”
The Texan, August 29, 2019. https://thetexan.news/social-vulnerability-index-will-factor-into-prioritizing-harris-
county-flood-risk-reduction/.
127 Flavelle, “A Climate Plan in Texas.”
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CONCLUSION
Houston’s flooding hazard is constructed through the interaction of flood-prone environmental
characteristics, like a flat topography and proximity to the Gulf of Mexico, and an approach to
urban planning that centers around growth, development, and real estate interests. The local
government has long deprioritized infrastructure spending and failed to respond to community
needs, leaving many vulnerable to flooding threat, among many other urban problems.
Throughout Houston’s history, storms and their subsequent floods have battered the city, but
since the late 20th century, major flooding has become more frequent, increasing in tandem with
development. To address the flooding hazard, the Harris County Flood Control District has relied
on three main strategies: modification of channels and bayous, detention basins, and finally, a
voluntary buyout, which has been in place for nearly 40 years and affected over 3,500
properties.132 In recent years, the city has seen signs of the buyout’s effectiveness. For example,
after the Memorial Day Floods of 2015, HCFCD official James Wade estimated that nearly 550
additional homes would have been flooded had they not been previously bought out.133
The record-breaking Hurricane Harvey in 2017 became a turning point for flood
management in Houston, fostering increased public support for major flood control efforts. A
new Democratic majority in the Harris County Commission introduced a focus on social
vulnerability in the allocation of funding for flood control projects, which departed from the
previous “worst first” approach and instead relies on more government intervention to account
for previous disinvestment. In action, the voluntary buyout reflects an anti-regulation,
market-based approach to flood control, yet in prioritizing areas of previous disinvestment, it
corrects for the earlier effects of this same approach. The expansion of the Houston buyout
133 Case Studies in Floodplain Buyouts: Looking to best practices to drive the conversation in the Houston region,
Houston, TX: Rice University Kinder Institute for Urban Research, (2018): 10.
132 “Home Buyout Program,” HCFCD.
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program, made necessary by the city’s continuing growth and the increasing frequency of flood
events as a result of climate change, must continue to address historic neglect of the city’s
vulnerable communities in order to create a more resilient Houson.
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CHAPTER 3. CHARLOTTE
Figure 3. The city of Charlotte, with Mecklenburg County outlined in red. Source:
Google Maps, adapted by the author.
Charlotte, North Carolina is a city with something to prove. The city was born as a modest
agricultural center, far from advantageous ports, rivers, or mountain gateways, and unimportant
in North Carolina politics.134 Famously, George Washington referred to Charlotte as “a trifling
place” in 1791,135 a remark which may have laid the foundation for the city’s “raging inferiority
complex.”136 Sometimes unfortunately confused with Charleston, South Carolina, and
136 Ibid., 25.
135 Matthew D. Lassiter, “Searching for Respect: From ‘New South’ to ‘World Class’ at the Crossroads of the
Carolinas,” in Charlotte, NC: The Global Evolution of a New South City, eds. William Graves and Heather A. Smith
(University of Georgia Press, 2010), 26.
134 William Graves and Heather A. Smith., eds., Charlotte, NC: The Global Evolution of a New South City.
(University of Georgia Press, 2010), 1.
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Charlottesville, Virginia, Charlotte’s civic aspirations can be described as “to catch up with
Atlanta and keep ahead of Raleigh.”137 Yet in recent decades, Charlotte has flourished, becoming
a magnet for immigration and an economic engine in the South. Charlotte’s growth exemplifies
the national demographic transition of Rust Belt decline and Sun Belt ascendance. Between 2000
and 2010, Charlotte’s population increased 31% and the greater metropolitan area had the fourth
fastest population growth in the nation.138 Mecklenburg County, which encompasses the city and
some surrounding towns, has a current population of 1.1 million.139 The relocation of young
professionals to Charlotte has created a youthful city, with fewer elderly residents and a larger
share of young adults relative to other American cities.140 Some of Charlotte’s draw can be
explained by the rise of the city’s banking industry. In the 1990s, Charlotte became the third
largest banking headquarters in the country, behind San Francisco and New York City, a spot the
city has maintained over the past 30 years.141
North Carolina is a destination state of rising numbers of Black Americans who are
moving to the South. Charlotte has been called a city where Black people can prosper. The city
beats the national average in Black household income and in rates of Black homeownership. The
local government, along with the city’s organizations and institutions, actively works to foster
and support Black entrepreneurship and Charlotte boasts more that 13,000 black owned
businesses. This is not to suggest that racial tensions and inequalities do not exist in Charlotte,
but merely that Charlotte’s urban conditions, including a healthy economy and relatively
141 Lassiter, “Searching for Respect,” 35.
140 Delmelle et al., “Densification without Growth Management?,” 3979.
139 U.S. Census Bureau, “QuickFacts Mecklenburg County, North Carolina” accessed January 18, 2021,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/mecklenburgcountynorthcarolina/PST045219.
138 Elizabeth C. Delmelle, Yuhong Zhou, and Jean-Calude Thill, “Densification without Growth Management?
Evidence from Local Land Development and Housing Trends in Charlotte, North Carolina, USA.” Sustainability,
vol. 6, (2014): 3976. doi:10.3390/su6063975.
137 Ibid., 24-25.
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integrated and diverse neighborhoods, allow for Black economic prosperity.142 Charlotte’s
diverse neighborhoods include immigrant communities, especially Mexican and Vietnamese
immigrants, who first arrived in the city during the 1990s.143 The pressures of growth have
shaped the modern Charlotte, from its ever-sprawling suburbia to its solidifying status as an
important cultural center in the South. This chapter traces the link between Charlotte’s expansion
and its growing flooding problem, culminating in a long-standing buyout program, which
promises unique flexibility and community responsiveness.
GROWTH AND PLANNING IN CHARLOTTE
In 1905, businessmen from the Greater Charlotte Club, which later became the Charlotte
Chamber of Commerce, adopted the slogan “Watch Charlotte Grow.”144 At the time, textile
manufacturing was the industry that produced the business elite in Charlotte. The local financing
structure for textile mills laid the groundwork for the rise of the banking industry, where the later
iterations of influential business leaders would get their start.145 As in Houston, the business elite
have long played a central role in Charlotte urban planning (though unlike Houston, Charlotte
has a zoning code). Later slogans adopted by the Chamber of Commerce include “A Good Place
to Make Money,” in the 1970s, and “The Sky’s the Limit” in 1991, both professing Charlotte’s
pro-business, pro-growth environment.146 Today, planning remains “the handmaiden of private
146 Lassiter, “Searching for Respect,” 24 & 35.
145 David Goldfield, “A Place to Come To,” in Charlotte, NC: The Global Evolution of a New South City, eds.
William Graves and Heather A. Smith (University of Georgia Press, 2010), 13.
144 Lassiter, “Searching for Respect,” 27.
143 Tom Hanchett, “Salad-bowl Suburbs: A History of Charlotte’s East Side and South Boulevard Immigrant
Corridors,” in Charlotte, NC: The Global Evolution of a New South City, eds. William Graves and Heather A. Smith
(University of Georgia Press, 2010), 255.
142 Noah Smith, “Why Raleigh and Charlotte work for black residents,” The News & Observer, March 29, 2018,
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/business/article207257439.html.
43
development,”147 with ideas of unrestrained growth and free market capitalism guiding much
decision-making. Consequently, Charlotte demonstrates a pattern of sprawl typical of other Sun
Belt cities, including Houston. Charlotte’s spatial expansion has largely occurred since the
1970s, catalyzed by an increasing auto-dependence and a car-centric urban planning approach.148
This ideology of urban planning neglects to address persistent problems of traffic, air pollution,
racial segregation, and, lastly, flooding.
Charlotte’s pro-growth planning strategy has not gone unquestioned by residents.
Beginning in the 1960s, the city’s corporate establishment faced a powerful grassroots backlash,
opening up a public debate which lasted decades. In the 1970s, corporate leaders promised “more
equitable growth” and the Chamber of Commerce released a statement declaring, “uncontrolled
growth is like cancer and will eventually cause the community to die.”149 Livability replaced
growth as the new buzzword. Some suggested that Charlotte do away with the Atlanta example
and instead emulate Portland, Oregon, with its dense, walkable urbanism and urban growth
boundary. In 1983, Mayor Harvey Gant, an architect and the first Black mayor of Charlotte
argued against an unfolding suburban spread, maintaining that the city should pursue controlled
growth in the urban core instead.150 Yet by the 1990s, a pro-growth collection of business leaders
were once again at the helm of Charlotte’s evolution and subdivisions were “[erupting] like hives
on the county’s periphery.”151
151 Goldfield, “A Place to Come To,” 17.
150 Ibid., 34-35.
149 Lassiter, “Searching for Respect,” 33.
148 Gerald L. Ingalls and Isaac Heard Jr., “Developing a Typology of African American Neighborhoods in the
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Graves and Heather A. Smith (University of Georgia Press, 2010), 168.
147 David Walters, “Centers and Edges: The Confusion of Urban and Suburban Paradigms in
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In recent decades, two conflicting trends dominate Charlotte’s urban planning. The city is
simultaneously pursuing outward suburbanization and central city revitalization, as demonstrated
by two large-scale planning projects. The 2007 construction of a light rail line, spurring
high-density, transit-oriented development, exemplifies the second form of urbanism.152 At the
same time, state and federal transportation authorities funded the construction of the outerbelt
freeway I-485, which cost three times the bill of the light rail project and which opened vast new
areas for suburban development.153 Charlotte’s development is guided not only by the city’s
urban planners, but also by free market forces and consumer preference. Recent demographic
changes and trends in consumer preference have encouraged densification in Charlotte. Young
professionals tend to have smaller households and many favor walkable, mixed-use
developments.154 The city has seen a 12.7% increase in population density between 2010 and
2015.155 Densification has occurred both in Charlotte’s urban core and its suburbs.156 In
densifying center city areas, gentrification and displacement of low-income residents is a
considerable concern. Both trends of outward suburbanization and central city revitalization are
largely guided by private profit-seeking developers rather than powerful planning initiatives or
restrictions, which explains the contradiction in planning ideology.157 These different patterns of
development interact with Charlotte’s natural environment, in some cases harmoniously and in
others, destructively.
157 Walters, “Centers and Edges,” 234.
156 Delmelle et al., “Densification without Growth Management?,” 3987.
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A HISTORY OF FLOODING
Charlotte is located in the southern Piedmont ecoregion of North Carolina, a region characterized
by a humid subtropical climate.158 In Charlotte, floods occur seasonally, when warm-season
thunderstorm systems and tropical cyclones drench the city.159 These floods develop along the
miles of creeks and rivers that crisscross the city, including Little Sugar Creek, Briar Creek,
McMullen Creek and Stewart Creek. Over the city’s history, Charlotte’s natural river systems
have not been left to flow in their natural state. For example, historical records suggest that Little
Sugar Creek, which skirts the center of downtown Charlotte, was straightened in the early
twentieth century to improve stormwater conveyance and allow development in the floodplain.
In the late twentieth century, as upstream development began to cause instability in the riverbed,
Little Sugar Creek was lined with concrete and rip-rap liner to prevent erosion. This strategy for
control of the river was abandoned in 2002, as the county began to demolish the concrete
banks.160 Previous ideas that the river could be dominated through clever engineering proved to
be misguided.
In addition to direct intervention, general urbanization and land use change have greatly
intensified Charlotte flooding. The specific causal linkages between development and flooding
are difficult to parse out because of the complexity of water drainage systems, and the many
variables involved in measuring both development and floods, but the general trend is clear:
overdevelopment has worsened Charlotte floods, beginning in the 1960s.161 In the past 40 years,
as the population of the Charlotte metropolitan area doubled, the developed land area
quadrupled. Farmland made up 70% of the Charlotte metropolitan area in 1949, but only 24% in
161 Zhou et al., “The complexities of urban flood response,” 7420.
160 Pete Romocki and Chris Matthews, “Charlotte, NC, Restores Stream and Wetlands Corridor Area,” in Cities and
Water, ed. Roger L. Kemp (McFarland & Co., 2009), 63.
159 Zhou et al., “The complexities of urban flood response,” 7411-7412.
158 Matthew D. Eastin, et al. “Temporal Variability of the Charlotte (Sub)Urban Heat Island.” Journal of Applied
Meteorology and Climatology, vol. 57 (2017): 82.
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1974. Between 1985 and 2008, Mecklenburg County has seen a 60% increase in impervious
surface area and a 36% reduction in tree cover.162 Imperviousness is an important metric in
relation to flooding, but the way the impervious surfaces connect to the drainage network is of
even greater importance. While some development-caused changes are episodic, with a reversion
to normal after some time, changes to the drainage network are especially permanent. These
types of changes to the drainage network have taken hold in the McMullen Creek basin, which
transformed from a mixed woodland and residential land use to a dense residential area between
1964 and 1984. The McMullen Creek has seen an average 3.4% increase in flood peak per year
between 1962 and 1995, translating to a doubling of the median annual flood in just 30 years.163
In each of Charlotte’s river basins, development and resulting flooding have manifested
differently, but the cumulative effect is a substantial citywide flooding threat.
A 1983 study by Ives and Furuseth examining community response after a 1979 flood
was an early example of academic recognition of Charlotte’s flooding problem. Ives and
Furuseth incorporated an analysis of environmental racism in their study, comparing the white
working-class neighborhood of Myers Park Manor, located on Little Sugar Creek, and the Black
working-class neighborhood of Smallwood, located on Stewart Creek. In both neighborhoods,
residents considered flooding to be a significant problem, among other neighborhood problems
such as crime, pollution, unemployment, and a lack of parks, yet opinions differed between
neighborhoods on what should be done. White Myers Park Manor residents were more resistant
to hypothetical relocation and favored increasing police power to restrict floodplain
development. Meanwhile, Black Smallwood residents exhibited less confidence in their ability to
deal with flood hazards and showed a preference for rehabilitation support and financial aid after
163 James A. Smith, et al.“The Regional Hydrology of Extreme Floods in an Urbanizing Drainage Basin.” Journal of
Hydrometeorology, vol. 3, no. 3 (2002): 270-271.
162 Eastin et al., “Temporal Variability,” 82-83.
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a flood event.164 In Smallwood, only 6% of respondents reported previous experience with
residential flooding or knowledge of the neighborhood’s flooding problem before moving in. In
Myers Park Manor, this percentage was three times higher, at 18%. Both figures indicated a
significant knowledge gap of neighborhood environmental hazards, suggesting a failure of local
government to inform potential buyers of these hazards, particularly if these potential residents
were Black.165 The Ives and Furuseth study revealed greater instability among Black residents of
Smallwood, in comparison to white residents of Myers Park Manor, when confronted with a
comparable flooding threat, a finding which supports the argument for considering social
vulnerability in flood mitigation efforts, as communities recover differently from the same
disaster.
Stormwater management regulations, representing the first governmental recognition of
the flooding problem, began in the 1970s. In the 1990s, stormwater wetlands and ponds were
added across Charlotte.166 These measures were not aggressive enough to mitigate the flood
problem. Comprehensive policy action would finally come after a series of extreme floods in the
late 1990s. The flood events included Tropical Storm Jerry in 1995 and Hurricane Danny in
1997, as well as three other lesser storm systems.167 After Hurricane Danny, officials from
Mecklenburg County Storm Water Services noted that a number of homes located outside of
mapped floodplains had flooded. According to Dave Canaan, Director of Storm Water Services,
“That’s when we really got curious of how accurate are our floodplain maps.”168 Adding pressure
was a county commissioners meeting at which 30 to 40 residents showed up with mops and
168 Cole del Charco, “When It Comes to Flooding Preparation, Charlotte Appears to be the Model,” WFAE, October
29, 2018, https://www.wfae.org/local-news/2018-10-29/when-it-comes-to-flooding-preparation-charlotte-appears-
to-be-the-model.
167 Smith et al.,“The Regional Hydrology of Extreme Floods,” 267.
166 Zhou et al., “The complexities of urban flood response,” 7405.
165 Ives and Furuseth. “Immediate Response to Headwater Flooding,” 519.
164 Sallie M. Ives and Owen J. Furuseth. “Immediate Response to Headwater Flooding in Charlotte, North Carolina.”
Environment and Behavior, vol. 15, no. 4 (1983): 523-525.
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buckets, demanding government action on flooding and demonstrating significant local support
for policy change.169 By the time Hurricane Floyd hit in September of 1999, causing hundreds of
millions of dollars in damage and killing 52 people,170 a flood buyout program was already in the
works, along with a substantial effort to update flood maps.171
THE CHARLOTTE BUYOUT
In July 1999, FEMA approved a $10.3 million plan to buy up 116 houses in flood-prone
Charlotte neighborhoods. The buyout was voluntary and FEMA funds covered 75% of the cost,
with Mecklenburg County Storm Water Services funding the remaining 25%.172 Since 1999, 423
properties have been bought out, affecting 700 families and businesses. In the past 22 years, the
buyout has created 185 acres of green space and prevented $25 million in losses for Charlotte.
Taking into account future losses, this $25 million will ultimately become $300 million saved.
After the buyout transaction, Storm Water Services seeks community input on what the land
should become. Sometimes the fire or police department uses the remaining structure for training
purposes.173 Once the building has been removed, the site is graded and grass is planted to
accommodate runoff and promote soil stability.174 Charlotte’s 185 acres of buyout land have
become community gardens, greenway trails, informal recreation areas, and reforested natural
areas.175 In some cases, the open land has been leased to nearby owners, who maintain the
175 “Floodplain Buyout (Acquisition) Program,” City of Charlotte.
174 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Storm Water Services. Flood Risk Assessment and Reduction Plan. Charlotte: January
2012. https://charlottenc.gov/StormWater/Flooding/Documents/Flood_RARR_Plan-Final.pdf. (accessed January 8,
2021): 26.
173 “Floodplain Buyout (Acquisition) Program,” City of Charlotte.
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property but don’t develop it. According to Tim Trautman, Mecklenburg County’s program
manager for engineering and flood mitigation activities, the program is about halfway finished,
with at least 500 more homes that could be bought out.176
Mecklenburg County relies on a Flood Risk Scoring System to determine where to
prioritize flood mitigation efforts, including but not limited to buyouts. All flood-prone
properties in the county receive a Flood Risk Property Score, which describes what a flood might
do to the existing structures, as well as the likelihood of flooding and the potential proximity of
the property to high-velocity stormwater. Members of the public can access these scores and use
them to make informed decisions. In combination with the Flood Risk Property Score, the Flood
Mitigation Priority Score is also calculated. This additional score accounts for community-based
benefits and other factors not captured in the Property Score, such as human life and safety, as
well as the location of the property in relation to other mitigation projects or publicly owned
land. Mecklenburg County prioritizes buyouts that include a bundle of properties rather than just
one. Unlike Houston’s prioritization framework, Charlotte’s Flood Risk Scoring system does not
incorporate an analysis of social vulnerability. The Flood Mitigation Priority score is as far as the
program goes in weighing more than pure flood risk. To ensure some fairness, the Flood Risk
Scoring System values all structures the same, whether a humble bungalow or a lavish
mansion.177
In addition to its scoring system, the Charlotte buyout has numerous other distinctive
features. Firstly, the program allows for non-disaster-related buyouts, and Mecklenburg Storm
Water Services reaches out to homeowners, rather than relying on homeowners to volunteer. This
177 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Storm Water Services, Flood Risk Assessment and Reduction Plan.
176 Peter Coutu, “Virginia Beach eyes expansive program to buy out frequently flooded homes. Charlotte could be a




means that homeowners can make decisions about the future of their property without the
pressure of a concurrent ongoing crisis. Secondly, the Charlotte buyout program includes an
allowance for post-acquisition leasebacks, which are rarely used, but can allow homeowners to
temporarily stay on their property after the buyout transaction. The leasebacks, which have been
implemented only 12 times in program history, offer flexibility in the case that a homeowner
encounters difficulties in finding a new home, or, for example, if an elderly homeowner wishes
to stay on their property until death. This aspect of the Charlotte buyout should be more widely
adopted by other buyout programs, because it demonstrates compassion for homeowners and has
the added benefit of offsetting buyout costs.178 Together, these features demonstrate a concern for
the well-being of the property owner throughout the buyout process.
The most obvious signature feature of Mecklenburg County’s flood buyout program is
it’s local funding source. Flood mitigation policy is traditionally handled through cooperation at
the federal and state levels,179 making Charlotte’s local funding and administration of its buyout
uncommon. Though FEMA grants initially sustained the program, in recent years it has been
primarily financed locally, at about $4 million annually. Most recent buyouts are funded
completely with local money, meaning that properties do not need to meet FEMA buyout
qualifications. Since 1999, the program has cost $67 million, with a breakdown of 43% federal
funding, 2% state funding, 48% local funding, and 7% other funds.180 Reliance on local funding
gives the Charlotte program flexibility and year-to-year consistency, though it also means less
access to extensive federal resources.181 Local funding allowed for the creation of a Quick Buys
program in 2003, which gave Mecklenburg County a “rainy day fund” to buy up damaged
181 Coutu, “Virginia Beach eyes expansive program.”
180 “Floodplain Buyout (Acquisition) Program,” City of Charlotte.
179 Kristin O’Donovan. “An assessment of aggregate focusing events, disaster experience, and
policy change.” Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 3 (2017): 204. doi:10.1002/rhc3.12116.
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properties immediately after a flood event, before the property owner might invest in expensive
and misguided repairs.182 In Charlotte, a local funding structure not only allows for more local
control in the implementation of the buyout, but also an expedited process which stands in
contrast to the sluggish pace of other buyout programs. One marker of the influence of
Charlotte’s locally-run program is the extent to which other local governments, for example in
Virginia,183 Alabama, and Florida,184 have sought guidance from Charlotte officials in emulating
the program.
CONCLUSION
Flooding in Charlotte, North Carolina is intricately bound to the city’s incredible growth. A
mantra of growth has long been at the heart of Charlotte urban planning, guided by powerful
business leaders and a government commitment to free enterprise. In the latter half of the 20th
century, Charlotte’s expansion, in both spatial and economic terms, reached new heights, making
Charlotte one of the fastest growing, youngest cities in the country. Yet as development
surpassed the carrying capacity of Charlotte drainage basins, flooding became an increasing
problem for many of the city’s residents. By the end of the 20th century, the flooding problem
demanded a policy solution, and the floodplain buyout program was created as part of a larger
strategy to mitigate flooding. From 1990 to 2015, a leveling out of flood frequency has been
observed, likely due to a combination of a slowdown in floodplain development and the effect of
the buyout program.185 Still, civil engineer Bill Hunt points to inadequacies in the overall
strategy, concluding, “what Charlotte has done works very well for two- or three-inch rains. But
185 Zhou et al., “The complexities of urban flood response,” 7420.
184 del Charco, “When It Comes to Flooding Preparation.”
183 Coutu, “Virginia Beach eyes expansive program.”
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we don’t have the tools to fix 11- or 12-inch rains.”186 Distinctive features of the Charlotte
buyout, including its local funding structure and its risk scoring system, make it stand out as a
model among other buyout programs. But to truly evaluate its effectiveness, the impact of the
program on Charlotte’s communities must be considered, in addition to its environmental impact.
186 Frances Stead Sellers, “One city’s plan to combat climate change: Bulldoze homes, rebuild paradise,” The
Washington Post, November 26, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-solutions/2019/11/26/
one-citys-plan-combat-climate-change-bulldoze-homes-rebuild-paradise/
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CHAPTER 4. THOSE WHO LEAVE AND THOSE WHO STAY
In theory, floodplain buyout programs are an excellent tool for moving people out of harm’s way.
In practice, these programs have complicated consequences. They set in motion processes of
migration, of depopulation, and of urban greening, which shape the lives of both those who
participate in buyout programs and those who do not. While previous chapters illuminated how
buyout programs formed in Houston and Charlotte, in response to specific flood conditions in
each urban environment as well as specific political contexts, this chapter considers how these
programs are carried out and how they are experienced by communities and residents. This
chapter poses questions such as: Where do buyouts happen and who participates? Where do
people who receive a buyout go? What happens to those who are left behind? Houston and
Charlotte provide the settings to evaluate the impact of two different buyout programs from
various perspectives. Neither program is an ideal model, yet both offer features that an ideal
model might emulate. This chapter discusses how funding influences the social justice
implications of each program, how buyouts are distributed throughout the socioeconomic layout
of each city, the experiences of relocating residents in Houston, and the use of green space in
Charlotte.
WHERE THE MONEY COMES FROM
The Houston and Charlotte buyout programs have in common their settings in sprawling Sun
Belt cities with low costs of land. Many differences between the two programs can ultimately be
traced back to the funding structure of each program. Funding is important for any flood control
project, but buyouts specifically require funding to meet high upfront costs, which are paid back
in savings over many years. Harris County operates a federally funded buyout program, while
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Charlotte-Mecklenburg’s program is locally funded. Federal funding, which comes from HUD’s
Community Block Development Grants and FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP)
and Flood Mitigation Assistance Program (FMA),187 has allowed the Harris County program to
become the largest in the nation, both in the number of properties acquired and total dollars
spent. Charlotte’s buyout operates on a smaller scale. Though it was once partially federally
funded, the program has been locally sustainable in recent years. Part of the funding comes from
local fees on impervious surface cover, which also serve the purpose of incentivizing minimal
impervious surface cover in new development.188 These different sources of funding shape not
only the scale and timeline, but also the implementation and larger community impacts of each
program.
The federal funding that allows for Harris County’s massive scale program comes with
strings attached. For example, HMGP funding is only available following a Presidential-declared
disaster,189 relies on congressional approval of disaster recovery funds, and the application
process takes between one and four years. The main option for speeding up this process requires
a community to use local funding as a stopgap and wait for federal reimbursement.190 For an
individual in Houston, a buyout may take eight to twelve months to get underway and the entire
process may last years.191 The timeline of the process has a substantial impact on participation. A
buyout planner in Kinston, a small city in eastern North Carolina, explained that after a flood,
“as time goes on the more comfortable they get back in that house, back in the floodplain. And
somehow they think that [a flood is] not going to come for another hundred years.”192 Data
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confirms the planner’s anecdotal finding that when people return to their homes, regardless of
damage level, they refuse buyouts at higher rates.193 The length of the process has different
impacts based on class. The wealthy can more easily afford to repair or rebuild their homes as an
alternative to waiting months and years for a buyout. Meanwhile, the poor may face a protracted
period of housing instability. A program that (indirectly) promotes relocating the poor while
protecting the wealthy is unjust.194 Because the Harris County buyout depends on federal funding
that is made available after disasters, buyouts are often occuring in a time of crisis.195 This adds
an extra burden on both officials, who must manage immediate relief efforts, and residents, who
may be living through great trauma and hardship, made worse for those already socially
vulnerable.
Meanwhile, in Charlotte, local funding allows for proactive buyouts, occurring before
natural disasters rather than in the midst of crisis and trauma.196 Mecklenburg County takes a
forward-looking approach, factoring in future development in projected flood risk. Some
properties that Storm Water Services designate as risky and appropriate candidates for buyouts
would not qualify for a buyout under FEMA funding criteria. This helps to explain why
Charlotte-Mecklenburg transitioned to a locally-funded program; many of the properties that met
FEMA criteria had already been acquired, yet flood risk persisted and the local government
recognized that FEMA risk maps were inadequate.197 Charlotte’s local mapping effort and
proactive buyouts represent a targeted risk management strategy, rather than a buyout approach
that depends on the actions of the willing seller.
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FEMA criteria restrict the number of properties that can be bought out in Houston. To
qualify for HMGP funding, properties must belong to a National Flood Insurance
Program-participating community with a FEMA-approved Hazard Mitigation Action Plan, and
each property must have its own NFIP policy. Additionally, each property must pass a FEMA
Benefit Cost Analysis (BCA), demonstrating that future flood damages surpass the cost of
purchasing the property and demolishing any structures. One critique of the BCA points out that
neighborhoods with low land values and cheap homes, in other words, the places where poor
people, Black and brown people, and elderly people often live, may not pass the analysis and
thus are less likely to receive buyouts, regardless of risk.198 Furthermore, the requirement that
HMGP recipients belong to communities that participate in the NFIP and have a Hazard
Mitigation Action Plan excludes those who live in communities that are inactive on flood control
(which is less relevant to Houston, but stands as a nationwide critique). By using local funds,
Charlotte’s buyout program avoids the restrictions of the property-level FEMA funding criteria
by which Houston’s program must abide. Still, it should be acknowledged that local programs
can have subjective, nontransparent criteria to determine which properties qualify for buyouts,
which can also result in unjust social impacts.199
Overall, local control in funding allows Charlotte’s program to avoid long timelines,
implement anticipatory buyouts rather than waiting for disaster, and choose buyout candidates
based on local criteria. As discussed in the previous chapter, Charlotte’s program uses
post-acquisition leasebacks for those homeowners who encounter difficulty in finding a new
home or for elderly homeowners who wish to stay on their property until death. This feature
demonstrates compassion for homeowners facing the stressful process of relocation.200 Though
200 Spidalieri and Smith, Managing the Retreat from Rising Seas, 50-52.
199 Siders, “Social justice implications,” 247.
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57
Charlotte’s program doesn’t have the explicit stated aim of addressing social vulnerability, as
Houston’s program does, it’s design better supports vulnerable residents.
Reliance on federal funding restricts the extent to which Houston’s buyout can operate
following principles of environmental justice. On the national level, studies on FEMA funding in
the aftermath of natural disasters find that the more FEMA aid a county receives, the more
unequal wealth becomes between more and less advantaged residents.201 As of 2018 in Houston,
all HMGP buyout funds have been used on single family homes even though multifamily and
other kinds of properties qualify.202 In contrast, Mecklenburg County has bought out multiple
multifamily buildings. Through internal emails, public advisories, and virtual seminars, FEMA
officials have recently communicated an intent to scrutinize traditional programs and their
disparate impacts by race, ethnicity, and class. Public pressure on FEMA to address equity built
after Hurricane Maria in 2017.203 In this context, the choice to design buyout programs around
FEMA funding, accepting all that the funding entails, should be questioned, as vulnerable
residents are consequently broadly disadvantaged. A comparison between Houston and
Charlotte’s program illuminates a tradeoff between inequity as a result of FEMA funding and a
large scale of a buyout program, made possible by federal funding.
BUYOUTS AND SOCIAL VULNERABILITY MAPS
The argument for designing buyouts to support vulnerable residents rests on the assumption that
buyouts are administered in neighborhoods with vulnerable populations. To test this assumption,
I analyzed the spatial distribution of buyout locations, since the beginning of each program, in
203 Thomas Frank, “Inside FEMA, a reckoning on race and flooded mansions,” E&E News, March 15, 2021,
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063727429.
202 Case Studies in Floodplain Buyouts, 7.
201 Howell and Elliott, “Damages Done,” 461.
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both Charlotte and Houston in comparison to 2018 Social Vulnerability Index maps of each city.
The Social Vulnerability Index is used in the field of disaster management to quantify the
socioeconomic and demographic factors that affect community resilience. An overall score
between 0 and 1 is calculated based on four themes: Socioeconomic Status, Household
Composition and Disability, Minority Status and Language, and Housing and Transportation.204
The CDC publishes maps showing overall SVI scores by census tract. In Charlotte, 48.5% of
buyouts have occurred in the census tracts with the highest social vulnerability, measuring above
0.75 on the 0.00 to 1.00 scale of the Social Vulnerability Index. The census tracts with the lowest
social vulnerability, measuring below 0.25, have the next highest concentration of buyouts, with
32.0% of the overall buyout count. The remaining 19.5% of Charlotte buyouts have occurred in
census tracts with median vulnerability, ranging from 0.25 to 0.75. Buyouts in Charlotte are most
likely to occur in the areas ranked highest on the Social Vulnerability Index. Though weighted
towards vulnerable areas, the distribution has a slight barbell shape, with few buyouts occurring
in medium vulnerable areas, and more in low vulnerable areas.
204 Barry E. Flanagan, “Measuring Community Vulnerability to Natural and Anthropogenic Hazards: The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention’s Social Vulnerability Index.” Journal of Environmental Health 80, no. 10 (2018):
34-36.
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Figure 4. Charlotte, NC: Social Vulnerability Index by Census Tract and Buyout Addresses
(blue). Source: SVI data from CDC, buyout addresses from Charlotte-Mecklenburg Storm Water
Services, adapted by the author.
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Figure 5. Houston, TX: Social Vulnerability Index by Census Tract (left) and Number of
Buyouts Per Tract (right). Source: SVI data from CDC, buyout locations from HCFCD, adapted
by the author.
61
Because of the scale of the program, the Houston buyout location data is less simply
summarized. Buyouts are numerous and spread out across a wide geographic area. Seventeen
census tracts have especially high concentrations of buyouts, ranging from 64 to 479 buyouts
within the tract. Of these 17 high-buyout tracts, eight measure above 0.75 on the Social
Vulnerability Index, with four of these eight measuring above 0.90. Another six of the seventeen
tracts are somewhat vulnerable, measuring between 0.50 and 0.75. The three remaining tracts
score low on the Social Vulnerability Index, indicating that they are largely higher-income,
whiter areas. Overall, the census tracts with high concentrations of buyouts are likely to be at
least somewhat vulnerable, and there are few examples of low-vulnerability tracts with large
numbers of buyouts.
The above analyses of buyout locations in relation to social vulnerability serve to indicate
that high numbers of buyouts occur in socially vulnerable neighborhoods in both Houston and
Charlotte. Harris County has recently adopted an approach to flood control that prioritizes areas
with high SVI scores for interventions like buyouts. Buyout location data supports the claim that
Houston buyouts occur frequently in highly vulnerable areas. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Storm
Water Services does not weigh SVI, but Charlotte buyout location data also demonstrates a skew
towards highly vulnerable areas, though a substantial portion of buyouts happen in less
vulnerable areas as well. Census-tract-level SVI data has its limitations in capturing the
relationship between social vulnerability and buyout programs. One of these limitations is that
neighborhoods change over time and buyouts have been occurring for decades, while the SVI
data above is a static representation anchored in the year 2018. SVI data does not capture
specific information about an individual receiving a buyout, which might influence their
individual experience. For example, simply because buyouts are occurring in predominantly
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Black or Latinx neighborhoods does not mean that the people receiving these buyouts are Black
or Latinx. However, general, community-level data is still informative because buyouts affect an
entire community, both those who leave and those who stay. Ultimately, an SVI analysis of
buyouts underscores the need for buyout programs to be designed around the desires and needs
of vulnerable populations.
A charitable interpretation of the above maps suggests that local governments, guided by
principles of equity and environmental justice, are serving vulnerable populations in providing a
path for these communities to escape flood hazard. Another interpretation is that local
governments are taking the path of least resistance to displace the vulnerable while the wealthy
and privileged stay in their homes and benefit from infrastructural flood control. Residents’
perspectives on the implementation of buyout programs in Charlotte and Houston is thus
important in considering which interpretation fits better.
RELOCATION AND DESTINATION
“I’ve got a nice place, but it’s just not the same. I don’t miss the flooding, which I guess was the
point of being moved in the first place. But it doesn’t feel like home yet.”
-- relocated resident of the Kashmere Gardens neighborhood, Houston, TX.205
While buyout programs and the larger strategy of managed retreat are well studied
subjects, little data exists to evaluate the outcomes of retreat.206 The question of where those who
relocated eventually ended up often goes unanswered. Yet, where people envision ending up is a
critical factor in whether they participate in a buyout program. Some of the complication in
206 Siders et al., “The case for retreat,” 763.
205 Kevin A. Lynn, “Who defines ‘whole’: an urban political ecology of flood control and community relocation in
Houston, Texas,” Journal of Political Ecology, vol. 24 (2017): 960.
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studying environmental mobility stems from difficulty in identifying who is moving for
specifically environmental reasons, as many other factors can contribute to a decision to move.207
Additionally, from a global perspective, the post-colonial Western gaze sees “environmental
migrants” as poor peasants from the global South. This bias diverts attention from the
environmental migration occurring within wealthy Western countries.208 Studies on climate
change induced migration, for example, tend to be funded by Northern countries and focused on
countries in the global South as study subjects, a finding which demonstrates that “privileged
countries consider themselves immune to mass displacement.”209 Hurricane Katrina stands out as
an environmental event inducing large-scale displacement in a Western country, and Katrina did
motivate scientific inquiry into environmental migration in the United States.210 An estimated
40,000 evacuees from Hurricane Katrina put down roots in Houston, and some of these people
would later experience Hurricane Harvey, creating an unfortunate compounding cycle of
relocation and risk.211
Despite gaps in scientific literature, government-imposed relocation is a reality for many
in the U.S., and has a long legacy, particularly in indigenous history. In the context of flooding,
dam projects have set a long precedent for forcing communities to move. One of the guiding
principles of relocation is that it should leave no community worse off, yet this principle is not
always realized. The UN has a list of standards for relocation resulting from infrastructural
projects, which include the demand that affected communities participate in relocation planning
and that an analysis must show that emotional, spiritual, and cultural attachment to the old site is
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not excessively high. Meanwhile, U.S. standards for relocation emphasize financial assistance
and deemphasize place attachment and emotional suffering. The Uniform Relocation Act (URA)
of 1970, amended in 1987, sets forth the US approach to relocation. The URA ensures that no
individual or family is displaced unless decent, safe, sanitary housing is available within the
displaced person’s financial means. The URA also requires that the relocated person receives 90
days notice to vacate prior to possession (in the case of involuntary relocation),
relocation-advisory services, reimbursement for moving expenses, and payments for the added
cost of renting or purchasing comparable replacement housing.212 These standards of relocation
guide the design of floodplain buyout programs.
According to David Love, Project Manager at Charlotte-Mecklenburg Storm Water
Services, the agency does not track where buyouts recipients move. Anecdotally, he said, a
majority tend to stay in Mecklenburg County or its surrounding counties.213 Studying Houston
buyouts, researchers Kevin Loughran and James Elliott found that over 90 percent of buyout
recipients stayed within the Houston metropolitan area and they moved a median distance of less
than 10 miles.214 Losing property tax revenue is a central concern for some local officials who
oppose buyouts.215 Fortunately, if buyout recipients tend to relocate within the same municipality,
as suggested in the cases of Houston and Charlotte, this concern proves to be largely unfounded.
Loughran and Elliot’s study of Harris County relocations revealed important social
dynamics undergirding participants’ choices about where to go. They demonstrated that Houston
residents approached the buyout as an opportunity for neighborhood upgrading. The social
benefits of the upgrade outweighed the reduction in environmental risks, meaning that many
215 Freudenberg et al., Buy-In for Buyouts, 25-26.
214 Loughran and Elliott, “Residential buyouts as environmental mobility,” 67.
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would move to another environmentally risky but socially improved neighborhood (though this
trend seems to have weakened for buyouts in the past two decades). Neighborhood upgrading
occurred regardless of how much money the buyout recipients received. On average, origin
neighborhoods had a per capita income of about $19,000 compared to a receiving neighborhood
per capita income of $23,000 (in 2000 dollars). Median housing values rose 32% between the
origin and receiving neighborhoods.216 The definition of a socially beneficial neighborhood did
not just involve income and housing value, however, but also racial demographics. The study
found that “the whiter, or more racially advantaged, the buyout area, the more likely
environmental movers are to relocate within them or to them despite publicly identified
environmental risks.”217 Residents in high income neighborhoods, who may be
disproportionately white, are likely to resist a buyout or resist moving out of their neighborhoods
after a buyout, instead preferring to simply buy more flood insurance. Meanwhile, low income
neighborhoods are likely to lose a significant amount of residents in the event of a buyout.218 The
Loughran and Elliott study demonstrates that “where environmental mobility leads powerfully
predicts whether it occurs.”219
KASHMERE GARDENS
Interviews of residents of the Kashmere Gardens neighborhood in Houston, collected by Kevin
A. Lynn, provide a personal perspective on relocation away from flood risk. Kashmere Gardens
is located in northeast Houston, between an industrial corridor and railroad lines and alongside
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and solid waste incinerators, in addition to pollution from illegal dumping into the bayou.
Flooding adds to the environmental hazards faced by residents. The Hunting Bayou watershed
consists of 30 square miles of drainage area with 45 miles of open streams. Out of the 91,000
people living in the Hunting Bayou watershed, 12,000 live in Kashmere Gardens. Homes in the
neighborhood have flooded twelve times between 1979 and 2016. Unsurprisingly, Kashmere
Gardens is characterized by both high environmental risk and high social vulnerability. The
neighborhood is 77% Black and 21% Latinx with a median household income of $22,000 (less
than half of Houston’s citywide median household income of $45,000).220 In Kashmere Gardens,
43% of households have an annual income less than $15,000. Only 52% of residents are high
school graduates and the neighborhood has a smaller proportion of working-age residents than
citywide figures, with more young and elderly people. Some residents felt that they were targeted
for buyouts because of the neighborhood’s high social vulnerability and lack of resources to
advocate for themselves.221
The Kashmere Gardens buyout was part of a larger infrastructure project known as
Project Hunting. First announced in 1990, the project called for the widening and deepening of
approximately four miles of the Bayou, the replacement and new construction of over 20 bridges,
the creation of a 300 million gallon stormwater detention basin, and property acquisition.
Construction work began in 2007 after a long planning process involving public meetings and
community input,222 and some parts of the project are still in progress.223 Project Hunting’s
decades-long timeline was a source of stress for residents of Kashmere Gardens, especially those
who eventually had to relocate. Some residents expected the plan to never fully come to fruition
223 “C-18 Project Hunting,” Harris County Flood Control District, accessed March 18, 2021,
https://www.hcfcd.org/Activity/Active-Projects/Hunting-Bayou/C-18-Project-Hunting.
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and were then caught off guard, while others planned to move years before they were contacted
with an offer. In the words of one resident,
“I was shocked when they came to tell me I might be losing my house. I think it was back
in the early '90s when we [the neighborhood] first heard about the county fixing the flood
problems around here. You heard about relocation ten years after that. When I finally did
hear about the relocation, I was of the mind that the plans were not going to happen.”224
Another resident described hearing the news of relocation as “a punch to the gut.”225 A long,
uncertain planning process may also deter public and private investment in the neighborhood,
leading to a less rich neighborhood life.
In this case, because buyouts were part of an infrastructural project and managed through
the Harris County Public Infrastructure Department (HCPID) working with the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers and in collaboration with the HCFCD, not all buyouts were voluntary, as they
typically would be under the HCFCD’s program. While some households accepted the initial
relocation offer from the HCPID, 40 households refused the offer and were involuntarily
moved.226 In managing the relocation, the HCFCD used relocation specialists, who are better
equipped to guide residents through the process in comparison to engineers, who might
otherwise be involved. These specialists are trained to be empathetic and have a good sense of
the local housing market. Still, residents and relocation specialists did not always see eye to eye.
Complaints about the Kashmere Gardens relocation specialists centered on the specialists’
226 Ibid., 958.
225 Ibid., 962.
224 Lynn, “Who defines ‘whole,’” 962.
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unreliability in providing information, especially specific dollar amounts. However, some found
the specialists to be helpful. One resident said,
“To be honest with you, the relocation lady was really nice and complimented me on my
home and how I kept it up and decorated it. I appreciated that. It kind of showed me that
she felt for my loss and respected me and my feelings. Poor folks, especially poor Black
folks, don't always get that kind of treatment from officials.”227
This resident’s words emphasize the necessity for officials to embody respect and empathy
throughout the relocation process. The resident recognizes their position of vulnerability, not
only because of their impending relocation, but also because of their identity as a person who is
poor and Black. Relocation specialists, or other officials who serve as guides throughout the
process, must acknowledge existing power dynamics and work to support residents.
Many residents reported a decline in mental and physical health due to the stress of the
relocation process, mentioning depression, anxiety, and problems sleeping. Residents expressed
anger at seeing their neighbors’ homes taken away, as well as frustration that some residents got
to stay in a now more flood-resistant Kashmere Gardens. One relocatee said,
“I don't know which has caused me more grief, the flooding or learning about having to
be relocated. I honestly think I am too old to be dealing with either of them. I usually
don't have problems sleeping, but lately that's been an issue. I get my blood pressure and
227 Lynn, “Who defines ‘whole,’” 961.
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heart rate checked pretty regularly over at the drug store, and their machine says there
haven't been any changes. But I know I don't feel the same because of all the stress.”228
For this elderly relocatee, the burden of the relocation cannot be underestimated. Officials who
oversee relocation cannot assume that all candidates are young, resilient people with no health
problems, who might have an easier time handling stress. The elderly are especially vulnerable to
losing their social support systems after relocation.229 The words of this elderly resident lead one
to wonder where they will go to check their blood pressure in a new neighborhood, or whether
they are losing important social support of Kashmere Gardens neighbors. Researcher Kevin Lynn
recommends that the HCFCD provide mental and physical health check ups along with
counseling for those undergoing relocation.230
Having completed the relocation process, some former residents expressed grief for their
lost neighborhood:
I wish I could come back to Kashmere Gardens. It wasn't perfect, and there are a few
raggedy houses and ugly spots, but there is something satisfying about being able to walk
around your neighborhood when the weather's nice and say hello to a good number of
people you know. I even miss walking to the Korean grocery store in the neighborhood.
Even though it is owned by Koreans, they [the owners] have certain things that people in
the neighborhood really like for both the black people and the Mexican people. It's little
things like that that make you feel like a neighborhood is your own.231
231 Ibid., 960.
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229 Siders, “Social justice implications,” 241.
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This resident stresses the sense of community they felt in Kashmere Gardens, also referencing
the racial and ethnic character of the neighborhood. Federal flood policy promotes moving
relocated households to neighborhoods that are racially and economically integrated,
discouraging moves to poor or majority-minority neighborhoods. Thus, federal policy “explicitly
and implicitly discounts the experiences of those who live voluntarily in neighborhoods that
policy makers find far from ideal.”232 Some relocatees might have wished for relocation options
within Kashmere Gardens, but federal policy would have discouraged this based on the
neighborhood’s demographic profile, in addition to potential flood risk in other parts of the
neighborhood.
The Kashmere Gardens buyout was not typical of HCFCD buyouts because of its
connection to a larger infrastructure project, which made some buyouts involuntary. Even so,
residents’ experiences of the buyout, in their own words, provide critical lessons on how
relocation away from flood risk can be better managed. Federal relocation policy tends to focus
on housing economics and financial compensation, but as Kashmere Gardens residents explain,
non-financial concerns are equally important and should be recognized in relocation policy. The
stress of a long duration process is another important lesson. Agencies should pursue a short
timetable for relocation projects, as long as they leave adequate time for community input in
planning. Clear communication between agencies and residents, as well as among residents, is
crucial throughout the process. As a way to ease the emotional turmoil of relocation, Lynn
recommends that relocating households be assembled into groups to provide a sense of
community and shared experience. He also recommends allowing space for households to say a
232 Lynn, “Who defines ‘whole,’” 960.
71
ceremonial goodbye to their neighborhood.233 Communal relocation can be very important to
cultural preservation and sovereignty, demonstrated by case studies in managed retreat from
across the world. In Belen, Peru locals returned to their original flood-prone homes because
designated resettlement buildings failed to account for their local culture and lifestyle, an
example which demonstrates the importance of considering non-financial factors in relocation.234
Buyouts and relocation programs emphasize “the greater good” of moving vulnerable people to
safer homes, but the harm and stress of these programs for individuals must be acknowledged.
Practices like providing counseling and fostering solidarity between relocating households can
reduce harm and affirm residents’ autonomy, creating a better, more just buyout program.
234 Siders et al., “The case for retreat,” 762.
233 Ibid., 963-964.
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Figure 6. A sample of buyouts along the Hunting Bayou in Kashmere Gardens. Satellite
imagery from January 2009 (top), March 2011 (middle), and November 2020 (bottom).
Source: Google Earth Pro, adapted by the author.
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NEW GREEN SPACE
One of the basic outcomes of a buyout is a new plot of green space, where a house or building
once stood. In Charlotte, green space created through buyouts sums to nearly 200 acres,235 while
in Houston, the acreage of buyout green space measures nearly 2,000.236 These figures bring up
the question: What does it mean for a city to create hundreds or thousands of acres of green
space?
The environmental and public health benefits of green space are well-documented. Aside
from absorbing floodwater and replenishing groundwater, green space filters air, removes
pollution, attenuates noise, cools temperatures, provides food, and supports local wildlife. Green
space in the form of parks, greenways, trails, and reserves is often a site of physical activity,
which comes with a significant health benefit. A documented link between a lack of parks and
higher community mortality rates demonstrates the importance of access to green space as a
public health issue.237 Psychological wellbeing is also linked to park access. A Dutch study found
that participants were less affected by a stressful life event if there was more green space near
their home.238 Recognition of the benefits of green space have led to a contemporary wave of
“urban greening” in many cities, intended to improve livability and add value to communities.239
Often this involves repurposing of obsolete or underused urban industrial infrastructure, like rail
corridors, back alleys, and remediated brownfields.240
240 Wolch et al., “Urban green space,” 239.
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Access to green space, and its myriad benefits, is a racial justice issue. In comparison to
white people, people of color have less access to parks nationwide, and the same is true for the
poor in comparison to the rich. Historically, people of color have lived in the urban core of a city
or in inner-ring suburbs, where green space is either scarce or poorly maintained in contrast to
the outer suburbs, primarily home to white people. Access itself is not the only problem. The size
and quality of parks, their facilities, the activities they support, and perceptions of safety are all
relevant factors in how beneficial access to parks can be. In an area with serious air pollution,
where residents are likely to be low income people of color, increasing physical activity outdoors
in a park simply intensifies residents’ exposure to pollution. In this hypothetical, the underlying
pollution must be dealt with before the benefits of the park can accrue.241 Access to green space
interacts with other environmental hazards that disproportionately harm people of color and low
income people.
Notably, the green space created through buyouts is public space, owned by the local
government, not cordoned off behind fences for private use. Low-density cities like Charlotte
and Houston have less public space per capita in comparison to denser cities. Instead, residents
enjoy increased private space, for example in the form of large backyards. Marc Parés and David
Sauri assert the importance of public space for fostering community and solidarity along
political, social, and economic lines. They characterize the modern urban lifestyle as being one
of privacy, “in which citizens look inward to residences and families, search for privacy, and
choose to become anonymous to the rest of the community.”242 Particularly in low-density,
car-centric cities, emphasis is placed on the individual and on the value of tranquility. City
242 Marc Parés and David Saurí, “Integrating Sustainabilities in a Context of Economic, Social, and Urban Change:
The Case of Public Spaces in the Metropolitan Region of Barcelona,” in The Sustainable Development Paradox:
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residents have minimized relations with each other, resulting in a weakers sense of personal
identification with the surrounding neighborhood and community.243 The transformation of
private space into public space in the sprawling cities of Charlotte and Houston, accomplished
through the mechanism buyouts, offers the possibility of an accompanying transformation in the
social and political life of community members, according to Parés and Sauri’s argument, simply
through creating space for community-building.
The idea that green space is beneficial for people in urban environments is well
supported, but “green equals good” is an oversimplification. Hillary Angelo challenges the
assumption that putting aside land for ecological reasons produces universal benefits for all,
pointing out the social construction of nature which ascribes a moral goodness that is not
inherent. Angelo describes potential negative consequences of urban greening; increasing
property values, the displacement of vulnerable populations, the deepening of existing
inequalities, and cultural imperialism in the design and use of space.244 Because of the value
ascribed to green space, property values tend to rise when greening occurs. The link is strongest
for dense urban neighborhoods but occurs with large natural areas in rural landscapes as well.
Property value increases from a variety of studies across the nation can be estimated at 8-10%.245
When a new park is opened, “green gentrification” may occur, paradoxically displacing
low-income residents who most need the access to green space. For this reason, Jennifer Wolch
and others suggest “just green enough” as a goal for urban greening, meaning small scale
projects shaped by community desires that avoid attracting development and creating
gentrification pressure.246 A successful, popular park induces gentrification, but an underused one
246 Wolch et al., “Urban green space,” 239-241.
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can also be detrimental to a neighborhood. Solecki and Welch use the term “green walls” to
describe neglected parks that function as spatial boundaries between neighborhoods distinct by
race or class. Perceptions of who is welcome and unwelcome in these parks are central.247
Buyouts can also create vacant lots that are not developed into parks and instead become markers
of disinvestment and population loss. Residents of neighborhoods with lots of vacant land and
abandoned buildings experience higher stress levels. The empty lots can threaten residents’ sense
of safety.248 Green spaces must be created with intentionality and care in order to embody Parés
and Sauri’s model of a park that fosters solidarity. Given the complicated impact of green space,
suggesting that buyouts create good through opening up green space in urban environments is
debatable. An approach that teases out specific factors and relies on case studies is more
productive in determining the consequences of creating green spaces through buyouts.
One of the most straightforward, positive results of urban greening for both Houston and
Charlotte is the capacity of green space to attenuate the urban heat island. The effect known as
the urban heat island (UHI) describes a surface temperature difference between urban and rural
areas, which can reach 10 degrees Celsius. Urban heat islands are mostly generated nocturnally,
when less nighttime cooling occurs in the city’s paved areas without tree cover. Heat islands
differ by city, depending on specific urban characteristics.249 Hot summers are typical in both
Houston and Charlotte and both cities demonstrate the phenomenon of the UHI. Charlotte’s UHI
has been warming by 0.19 degrees Celsius per decade, starting in 1975, an indicator of the city’s
population growth and rapid spread of development.250 The geographic outward spread of
250 Ibid., 99.
249 Matthew D. Eastin, et al. “Temporal Variability of the Charlotte (Sub)Urban Heat Island.” Journal of Applied
Meteorology and Climatology, vol. 57 (2017): 81.
248 Manny Ramos, “Why tearing down Englewood to save it hasn’t worked,” Chicago Sun Times, August 23, 2019,
https://chicago.suntimes.com/platform/amp/news/2019/8/23/18628520/englewood-demolition-chicago-
population-loss-vacant-lots-new-construction-permits.
247 Paul H. Gobster, “Urban parks as green walls or green magnets? Interracial relations in neighborhood boundary
parks,” Landscape and Urban Planning, vol. 41 (1998): 43.
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Houston’s UHI since 1985 has been noted,251 and researchers have pointed to the impact of
changes in population density and the large influence of urban surface changes as contributing to
the trend.252 Urban heat islands are an environmental justice issue, as poor neighborhoods are
more likely to experience their effects in comparison to affluent neighborhoods.253 The buyout
programs in Charlotte and Houston are not creating green space at a fast enough rate to
counteract development and reverse the expansion and intensification of each city’s UHI. The
impact is felt instead at the neighborhood level, where the addition of a park or small plot of
land, with trees that provide shade cover, can offer a small reprieve from extreme heat.
Impervious surfaces intensify two substantial urban environmental problems: flooding and heat.
Buyouts address both of these at once, even without involved landscaping or park design.
Two creekside trail projects in Charlotte demonstrate a relatively simple reuse of
formerly developed land. In the previous chapter, I discussed the 1983 study by Ives and
Furuseth, comparing residents’ flood experiences in Myers Park Manor, a white working-class
neighborhood, and Smallwood, a Black working-class neighborhood. While racial demographics
have remained consistent, the Myers Park neighborhood has become increasingly affluent since
Ives and Furseth’s study, while Smallwood has remained working-class. At the time of the study,
Charlotte’s buyout program did not exist, but since then, 67 buyouts have occurred in Myers
Park, all but five of these along one stretch of the Little Sugar Creek. Based on satellite imagery,
the buyouts along Little Sugar Creek occurred between 1998 and 2002. In Smallwood, 27
buyouts have occurred, 21 of which were along a stretch of the Stewart Creek. Satellite imagery
253S. L. Harlan et al., “In the shade of affluence: the inequitable distribution of the urban heat island,” in Equity and
the Environment (Research in Social Problems and Public Policy, Vol. 15), ed. R. C. Wilkinson and W. R.
Freudenburg (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2007), 173-202.
252 Leiqiu Hu and Nathaniel A. Brunsell, “A new perspective to assess the urban heat island through remotely sensed
atmospheric profiles,” Remote Sensing of Environment, vol. 158 (2015): 402.
251 David R. Streutker, “Satellite-measured growth of the urban heat island of Houston, Texas,” Remote Sensing of
Environment, vol. 85 (2003): 288.
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suggests that these 21 buyouts occurred between 2004 and 2005. The gaps between these two
neighborhoods, both in timing and number of buyouts, does not necessarily indicate that local
officials gave lower priority to Smallwood buyouts. The neighborhoods are substantially
different in size, and property-level risk, as well as resident autonomy could have played a role in
how many buyouts occurred. Still, as two neighborhoods with comparable and longstanding
flooding problems, yet significantly different levels of social vulnerability, it is worth pointing
out that the Little Sugar Creek project in Myers Park was more extensive and happened years
earlier in comparison to the Stewart Creek project in Smallwood. By 2012, multiuse trails had
been built along both the Little Sugar Creek and Stewart Creek in the space created by the
buyouts, and both creeks had undergone some reengineering; for Little Sugar Creek, a transition
from a straight channel to a winding one, and for Stewart Creek, the creation of a detention
basin. Both paths connect to other parks and larger trail systems. In terms of the use of green
space, the outcomes of these two different projects are largely similar. The trails represent a
typical reuse of the green space produced by blocks of buyouts, a project that is not reserved for
affluent, white areas, nor is it so desirable and large-scale as to cause gentrification in poorer
neighborhoods. These projects are “just green enough.”
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Figure 7. Buyouts along Little Sugar Creek, satellite imagery from January 1993 (left)
and April 2010 (right). Source: Google Earth Pro, adapted by the author.
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Figure 8. Buyouts along Stewart Creek, satellite imagery from May 2004 (left) and
August 2012 (right). Source: Google Earth Pro, adapted by the author.
A larger-scale, more involved project that repurposes buyout property can be seen in the
Chantilly neighborhood, just southeast of Charlotte’s central business district. The Chantilly
Ecological Sanctuary is a recent addition to Charlotte’s green space that expands an existing
modest rectangle of green space bordered by train tracks, known as Chantilly Park. The 24-acre
plot of new green space once housed the flood-prone Doral and Cavalier apartment complexes,
built in the 1960s along Briar Creek.254 The Doral Apartments, in particular, had incurred $12
million in structural and content damages in the previous decade due to repetitive flooding.255
Storm Water Services bought the Cavalier apartment buildings for $9.6 million, with an
additional $3 million towards tenant relocation and building demolition, in 2008. Two years later,
255 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Mecklenburg County Gets $5.4 Million for Flood Buyout:
2006 Region IV News Releases, Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, LLC, 2006.
254 Liz Logan, “What to know about the Chantilly Ecological Sanctuary, Opening in September,” Charlotte
Observer, June 21, 2018, https://www.charlotteobserver.com/charlottefive/c5-around-town/article236144273.html.
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half of the Doral complex was purchased and demolished for $4.7 million, with $1.6 million
toward tenant relocation and demolition. Before demolition, Habitat for Humanity collected
reusable items like appliances and light fixtures and the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police
Department used the buildings for K-9 practice.
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Figure 9. Chantilly Ecological Preserve, satellite imagery from March 2007 (above) and
August 2019 (below). Source: Google Earth Pro, adapted by the author.
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In late 2018, after a decade of planning, the project opened to the public, offering a
certified water fowl sanctuary and a greenway trail, with a promised connection to a larger trail
system by 2023. In designing the restoration of the landscape, Storm Water Services partnered
with the Butterfly Highway, a statewide initiative to restore native pollinator habitats. In addition
to public use, the ecological sanctuary is intended to be used as an educational space for the
neighboring Chantilly Montessori School.256 The Chantilly Ecological Sanctuary is situated in a
mostly white neighborhood with low social vulnerability, yet within a walking distance radius of
the park are neighborhoods with higher vulnerability. Grier Heights, just south of the ecological
sanctuary, is a majority-minority neighborhood in which approximately 57% of residents live
below the poverty line and nearly a third have no high school diploma. The neighborhood was
once a rural Black community that was enveloped by the expanding city and became an island of
Black settlement surrounded by high income, white neighborhoods.257 Today, the location of the
Chantilly Ecological Sanctuary facilitates visits from residents of a variety of neighborhoods and
communities. Though the Chantilly Ecological Sanctuary project began with the displacement of
residents of the Cavalier and Doral apartments, the project engages its surrounding community
and offers important ecological benefits beyond simply storing floodwater.
CONCLUSION
Measuring the success of floodplain buyout programs is not straightforward. Any declaration of
success or failure should not be exclusively informed by statistics published by local
governments on the breadth of their program; instead, the experiences of the individuals who
participate in buyouts or watch buyouts change their neighborhood are most important. This
257 Ingalls and Heard, “Developing a Typology of African American Neighborhoods,” 177.
256 Liz Logan, “Chantilly Ecological Sanctuary.”
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chapter provides multiple approaches to determining the impact of buyout programs on
communities and individuals. Residents of Kashmere Gardens illuminated the incredible stress of
relocation, emphasizing concerns unrelated to the financial aspects of relocation, which tend to
be overlooked by agencies managing relocation. Relocation away from flood risk within the U.S.
remains understudied in scientific literature, and the destinations of buyout recipients are only
vaguely understood by local agencies, despite the centrality of this knowledge in explaining the
outcome of a buyout. As demonstrated through buyout location maps, areas high in social
vulnerability are often also settings for concentrations of buyouts in Charlotte and Houston. This
emphasizes the importance of designing buyout programs to support and uplift residents, who
may be struggling against many systemic challenges in addition to flood risk. While Houston’s
program, unlike Charlotte’s, makes their aim of addressing social vulnerability explicit,
conducting a greater number of buyouts in socially vulnerable areas does not automatically mean
that Houston’s program is more equitable for participants. Local funding allows Charlotte’s
program to create an easier, more flexible process for participants, while Houston’s reliance on
federal funding leads to less equitable outcomes. Park projects in Charlotte reveal the
possibilities for community-centered reuse of buyout property, yet the creation of green space in
urban communities must be done with intentionality and care to truly benefit community
members. Taken together, Houston and Charlotte’s programs highlight considerations that are
critical to conceptualizing a successful, equitable buyout.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION
The current U.S. approach to flood management is flawed and outdated. For decades, federal,
state, and local governments have relied on dams, levees, and other large, expensive
infrastructure projects in combination with a deeply dysfunctional insurance system to protect
Americans from encroaching floodwater, while turning a blind eye to rampant overdevelopment
of floodplains. Far from solving the problem, this has led to growing estimates of the number of
people who will experience flooding in the next decades and high rates of construction in the
most flood-prone areas in coastal states.258 Climate change promises to intensify flood risk across
the nation, through rising sea levels, intense storms, and unpredictable rainfall. These
environmental conditions are not merely happening to the city but produced through it. Urban
social processes are deeply intertwined with natural processes and cannot be separated. The U.S.
approach to flood control has failed to address the injustice of flood risk; people of color and low
income people are more likely to experience floods and less likely to recover from disaster as
quickly as their white and affluent counterparts. These circumstances call for a reimagination of
flood management in the U.S.
Floodplain buyout programs exist across the U.S. and have been in place for decades,
beginning with the relocation of Niobrara in 1973. Despite their ubiquity, buyout programs tend
to be modest and are seen as experimental. They are an underdeveloped policy tool, yet have a
great potential to make cities more resilient and to offer a lifeline to homeowners trapped in a
cycle of repetitive flooding. Houston and Charlotte were early adopters of flood buyouts and
these cities represent case studies in how well-established buyout programs function in large
urban centers. It is no coincidence that Houston and Charlotte both have large buyout programs,
258 Flavelle, “Homes Are Being Built the Fastest.”
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because both municipal governments have a long history of practicing an urbanism that avoids
land-use regulation. In both Houston and Charlotte, overdevelopment of floodplains in
combination with local environmental characteristics created a substantial flooding problem for
each city, which necessitated bold intervention. Each city’s buyout program has the nearly
impossible task of correcting for a history of deregulation in real estate. Yet, neighborhood by
neighborhood, these programs are effective in reducing the impact of flooding events.
Neither Houston nor Charlotte’s program is infallible. Both programs raise concerns
about equity and disparate impact, as does the general buyout model. After all, property
ownership is the foundation on which the buyout model is designed, and due to wealth inequality
and racist gatekeeping, property ownership has never been accessible to everyone. Buyout
programs have been criticized as a reinvention of redlining.259 The stress of relocation is
substantial. Nationwide shortages of affordable housing add to the difficulty of relocation. These
concerns are not to be taken lightly. However, the alternative of outright neglect for vulnerable
residents, who must finance their own flood mitigation and adaptation strategies, is unacceptable.
In Houston, Harris County Commissioners have advanced the national conversation on
equitable disaster recovery through their incorporation of the Social Vulnerability Index into the
County prioritization framework of flood control project funding. The concept of “social
vulnerability” acknowledges that communities are differently impacted by natural disaster and
that the extent to which a community recovers is determined not only by the environmental
severity of a disaster but also the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the
community. Furthermore, community resilience is a function of how recovery resources are
distributed by government agencies. So-called “natural” disasters are intricately linked to social
and political conditions and processes. Social Vulnerability Index maps bring to light the spatial
259 Freudenberg et al., Buy-In for Buyouts, 27.
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inequalities of Houston and Charlotte. These maps allow for an analysis of how buyouts are
administered among privileged and disadvantaged communities, and in both cities, I found that
significant numbers of buyouts occur in the most vulnerable neighborhoods. In Houston, using
the SVI to inform funding allocation is merely the first step in ensuring that the city’s buyout
program is designed to support the most vulnerable Houstonians. Environmental risk cannot be
addressed separately from social injustice.
The Houston and Charlotte programs each have an impact beyond county borders, as
other flood buyout programs across the state and nation look to duplicate each program’s success
and learn from its failures. Because buyout programs are designed locally and vary widely, these
programs are all test cases, demonstrating the many ways to handle relocating residents from
flood risk. Even a minor program that pioneers a unique feature has the potential for an outsized
impact on approaches to flood control across the nation. Both Houston and Charlotte appear as
case studies in multiple reports intended to foster the creation of new managed retreat programs.
Beyond the SVI, Houston contributes a model for how to move residents away from flood risk
on a mass scale, as the largest buyout program in the nation. Meanwhile, the influence of
Charlotte’s program, as well as other local programs throughout the state, can be seen in the
creation of a North Carolina state-wide buyout program overseen by the North Carolina Office of
Recovery and Resiliency. This office was established in the aftermath of Hurricane Florence in
2018 and the state-wide buyout was announced in late 2019.260 A state-level buyout program can
be a lifeline for those communities who haven’t engaged in buyouts due to high barriers to entry,
yet face significant flood risk. Across state borders, Virginia officials called Charlotte’s program
260 Ford Porter, “N. C. Office of Recovery and Resiliency Makes Critical Progress in First Year.” North Carolina
Office of the Governor, December 12, 2019. https://governor.nc.gov/news/nc-office-recovery-and-resiliency-makes-
critical-progress-first-year.
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a “gold standard” that would inform a planned Virginia Beach buyout program.261 Charlotte is a
national leader in flood risk mapping and flood sensing as well. The city’s Flood Information &
Notification System (FINS) has been implemented statewide and other states, such as Alabama
and Florida, have partnered with North Carolina to create similar programs.262 Lessons learned
from Houston and Charlotte have a sphere of influence far beyond the sprawling outskirts of
each city. These programs affect not only thousands of Charlotteans and Houstonians, but the
millions of people facing flood risk across the nation.
Drawing from the lessons of Houston and Charlotte, an ideal buyout program would have
certain characteristics. First, the program must be community-driven, designed in collaboration
between government officials and residents, so that community needs and desires are met. People
must be valued over properties. Buyouts should not be reduced to an economic equation, as
financial measurements like the cost benefit analysis, the cost of damage, the lost property tax
revenue, the pre-flood market value, and other inputs and outputs can obscure more than they
clarify. The unquantifiable environmental benefits of floodplain restoration and the social
dynamics of relocation should be considered in a context unconstrained by capitalist economics.
As begun in Houston, addressing social vulnerability and promoting environmental justice
should be organizing principles of the ideal buyout program. A better understanding of flood
risk, including better mapping and data, allows buyout programs to be more forward-thinking.
While buyouts should remain voluntary, a targeted strategy including pre-disaster planning is an
improvement over a first-come, first-serve buyout conducted in the wake of disaster. Alternative
funding models, like Charlotte’s impermeable surface tax, would help make ambitious buyout
strategies possible. Federal support in funding and administration is crucial for communities
262 del Charco, “When It Comes to Flooding Preparation.”
261 Coutu, “Virginia Beach eyes expansive program.”
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without other resources. Finally, buyouts should be part of a holistic flood control strategy, which
must include land-use regulation and dense development of affordable housing in areas safe from
flooding.
As long as they have existed, cities have dealt with floods. In the time of climate change,
the threat of flooding will become ever more present in many of the nation’s cities, as well as
cities across the globe. Though originally designed to manage inland riverine flooding, buyout
programs are a tool for addressing sea level rise--not an unfamiliar, experimental tool, but a tool
which has been tested for decades in large urban centers like Houston and Charlotte. The new
urban question is how to build sustainable, resilient cities, in which all can live safely without
facing harm from environmental disasters. Answering this question requires letting go of a
conception of nature as an antagonist, something entirely separate from the urban. The urban and
the natural are intertwined, and the urban built environment must leave space for natural
processes, like the absorption of rainwater into the earth. Floodplain buyout programs create this
space and chip away at the ethos of reckless development that has not served cities in the past.
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